Dynamic managerial capabilities: Scale development and validation

Studies on dynamic managerial capabilities still have a rather theoretical nature, and there is great difficulty in finding a valid, reliable instrument to measure this construct. The present study contributes to solving this problem: It aims to develop and validate a scale to measure dynamic managerial capabilities. In this investigation, we develop a scale for three factors related to dynamic managerial capabilities: human capital, managerial cognition (already described in the literature), and relationship networks. The prominent finding in this research is the factor that is referred to here as relationship networks.     

RULE CHANGES AND UNCERTAINTY IN DISCRIMINATORY AND UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS

The auction literature indicates that uncertainty about the value of auctioned goods increases underpricing in discriminatory price auctions. Such uncertainty has a smaller effect on uniform price auctions because the pricing rule aggregates bidders' information. We find that uncertainty resulting from inexperience with an auction mechanism has similar effects. Using initial public offering (IPO) data from Japan and Israel, we find that average underpricing increases temporarily in Japan's discriminatory price auctions after changes in the auction rules, which suggests that bidders reduce their bids in response to uncertainty. Underpricing in Israel's uniform price auctions is not affected by rule changes.     

Government Deficit, Public Investment, and Public Capital in the Transition to an Aging Japan

This paper examines the effects of government deficits, public investment, and public capital on welfare in the transition to an aging Japan by applying a simulated general equilibrium growth model. One of the main results of this paper is that targeting only high economic growth would mislead us as to economic policies, and that a policy to reduce future government deficits is most preferable for almost all generations, even though a cut in future deficits must be followed by a decrease in public investment, thus a decrease in public capital in the future. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 462–491. Faculty of Economics, Shiga University, Japan; and Management School, Imperial College, United Kingdom. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H55, H54, H62, C68, J10.     

The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India

This article investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of the manufacturing sector at the state level in India. We employ conviction rates of corruption-related cases as an instrument for the extent of corruption, address the underreporting problem, and examine the impact of corruption on the gross value added per worker, total factor productivity, and capital-labor ratio of three-digit manufacturing industries in each state. Our estimation results show that corruption reduces gross value added per worker and total factor productivity. Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of corruption are more salient in industries with smaller average firm size.     

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach

This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.     

Jean Tirole,Nobel Prize Winner

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for 2014 to Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Toulouse, France ‘for his analysis of market power and regulation’. What commonly characterizes Jean Tirole's work is a combination of rigorous scientific analysis of markets and provision of useful scientific insights and policy guidance for regulation and competition policy in such markets. This paper focuses on two of Tirole's papers, both co-written with Jean-Charles Rochet, which probably best exemplify his policy-oriented research. It summarizes and then explains how the theory that these papers develop led to the implementation of a new policy regulating the payment card industry in the European Union.     

COMMODITY CONTENT IN A GENERAL INPUT–OUTPUT MODEL

This technical paper provides a definition of ‘commodity content’ in extended von Neumann–Morishima models of production. Our definition admits as special cases the classical definition of ‘labour values’ in Leontief models, as well as Morishima's definition of ‘optimal values’ in a von Neumann model. Proper joint production, heterogeneous labour, durable consumption goods, household activities and disposal processes are all allowed for. We also propose a tentative mathematical criterion for defining bads and for distinguishing between unskilled and skilled labour.     

Market Size and Firm Location in a Service Industry

This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole.     

Technical Changes and the Rate of Profit in Models with Joint Production and Externalities: A Duality Approach

This paper generalizes a result due to Okishio: the rate of profit increases as a result of cost reducing technical changes. The generalization is carried out first in a model of joint production which allows for new processes and commodities to be introduced or some of the old ones to be discarded. Then we consider nonlinear models incorporating external and internal (dis)economies