International reserves and swap lines: Substitutes or complements?

Developing Asia experienced a sharp surge in foreign currency reserves prior to the 2008–9 crisis. The global crisis has been associated with an unprecedented rise of swap agreements between central banks of larger economies and their counterparts in smaller economies. We explore whether such swap lines can reduce the need for reserve accumulation. The evidence suggests that there is only a limited scope for swaps to substitute for reserves. The selectivity of the swap lines indicates that only countries with significant trade and financial linkages can expect access to such ad hoc arrangements, on a case by case basis. Moral hazard concerns suggest that the applicability of these arrangements will remain limited. However, deepening swap agreements and regional reserve pooling arrangements may weaken the precautionary motive for reserve accumulation.     

Capital controls in Brazil – Stemming a tide with a signal?

Controls on capital inflows have been experiencing a renaissance since 2008, with several prominent emerging markets implementing them in recent years. We focus on Brazil, which instituted five changes in its capital account regime in 2008–2011. Using the synthetic control method, we construct counterfactuals (i.e., Brazil with no policy change) for each of these changes. We find no evidence that any tightening of controls was effective in reducing the magnitudes of capital inflows, but we observe some modest and short-lived success in preventing further declines in inflows when the capital controls were relaxed. We hypothesize that price-based capital controls’ only perceptible effect is to be found in the content of the signal they broadcast regarding the government’s larger intentions and sensibilities. In the case of Brazil, its left-of-center government’s willingness to remove controls was perceived as a noteworthy indication that the government was not as hostile to the international financial markets as many expected it to be.     

Development threshold,capital flows,and financial turbulence

We study capital flows in a panel of 130 countries, and derive the implications for the observed patterns of capital flows and capital controls before and into the crisis of 2008–11. We find that the size of capital flows is positively correlated with country's income level. In addition, capital flight has a non-linear relationship with the income level. Using the Hansen threshold estimation, we identify a three-stage threshold effect: for low-income countries (GDP per capita below US$ 3,000), capital flight increases as the income level rises; and only after the economy passes a threshold level (GDP per capita above US$ 5,000), capital flight declines with income. We conclude with a case study of Brazil and Korea, observing that the decisions to implement capital control measures tend to be pushed around by the feedbacks among economic growth, currency appreciation, and the global financial conditions.     

China’s Growth,Stability, and Use of International Reserves

Since the onset of the global financial crisis, China and the U.S. have reduced their current-account imbalances as a share of GDP to less than half their pre-crisis levels. For China, the reduction in its current-account surplus post-crisis suggests a structural change. Panel regressions for a sample of almost 100 countries over 1983–2013 confirm that the relationship between current-account balances and economic variables changed in important ways after the financial crisis. China’s rebalancing has been accompanied by a decline in its reserves-to-GDP ratio and greater outward FDI that, in turn, has mitigated reserve hoarding.     

Capital Flows and Economic Growth in the Era of Financial Integration and Crisis, 1990–2010

We investigate the relationship between economic growth and lagged international capital flows, disaggregated into FDI, portfolio investment, equity investment, and short-term debt. We follow about 100 countries during 1990–2010 when emerging markets became more integrated into the international financial system. We look at the relationship both before and after the global crisis. Our study reveals a complex and mixed picture. The relationship between growth and lagged capital flows depends on the type of flows, economic structure, and global growth patterns. We find a large and robust relationship between FDI – both inflows and outflows – and growth. The relationship between growth and equity flows is smaller and less stable. Finally, the relationship between growth and short-term debt is nil before the crisis, and negative during the crisis.     

International fund investment and local market returns

International fund investment in bonds and equities is characterized by a positive association between current net inflows and contemporaneous and past market returns: positive-feedback trading, while being possibly profitable for international fund investors, could be destabilizing for the underlying markets. Allowing for interactions between equity investment and bond investment, our panel vector autoregression shows that past equity returns contain useful information in forecasting equity and bond flows and that bond flows impact future equity returns positively.     

Housing Bubbles,Economic Growth,and Institutions

Open Economies Review - Rising housing prices are accompanied by higher household consumption and firm investment that boost economic growth. However, excessive house price appreciations may...     

THE USA AS THE 'DEMANDER OF LAST RESORT' AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA'S CURRENT ACCOUNT

Abstract.  The present paper evaluates the current account patterns of 69 countries during 1981–2006. We identify an asymmetric effect of the USA as the 'demander of last resort': a 1% increase in the lagged US imports/GDP is associated with a 0.3% increase in current account surpluses of countries running surpluses, but results in insignificant changes in the current accounts of countries running deficits. The impact of US demand variables is larger on the current accounts of developing countries than that of OECD countries. We also contemplate China's current account over the next 6 years, and project a large drop in its current account/GDP surpluses.     

On the Causality between Trade Credits and Imports: Evidence and Possible Implication for Trade Penalties on Debt Defaults

Abstract

This study investigates the association between trade credits and imports of developing countries. Made available by its creditors, the main function of trade credits is to facilitate cross-border transactions of goods and services. This study finds that the reliance of imports on trade credits varies across regions and income: towards the end of the 1990s, the trade credits to imports ratio ranged from 0.20 for East Asia & the Pacific to 0.87 for Africa, and from 0.24 for high-income countries to 0.79 for low-income countries. Applying panel and cross-country estimation, we find that past trade credits help predict current imports, but past imports do not alter the future path of trade credits. Further, the positive association between trade credits and imports is larger for countries more dependent upon trade credits. The findings support the notion that countries make debt repayments to avoid any potential disruption on the line of trade credits. We also find that the trade credits penalty could materialize within less than two quarters.     

Monetary integration in ASEAN+3: A perception survey of opinion leaders

Recently, the ASEAN+3 countries have taken a number of measures to bolster monetary integration. These include the establishment of the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue and the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). More recently, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was also established as an independent surveillance unit. Also, business cycles in the region are starting to become more synchronized. Policymakers have, however, not heeded to calls for introducing a regional monetary unit (RMU) to strengthen regional surveillance and to promote greater exchange rate coordination. Why and what are the practical issues and constraints in introducing the RMU? What actions could be taken in the short and the longer term to promote exchange rate coordination? This paper assesses the views of ASEAN+3 opinion leaders through a perception survey. The opinion leaders feel that RMU, CMIM, and AMRO could go a long way in deepening monetary integration in the region.