Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Restructuring financial systems in transition and developing economies: an approach based on the French financial system

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the redesigning of financial systems in Central and Eastern European and developing countries by focusing attention on specific financial institutions appropriate to easing the transition and fostering the creation of markets. The paper argues that the immediate emulation of the better-known institutions of the most developed, market-based financial systems, i.e. the US and the UK, should not be taken for granted. It underlines, instead, the importance of drawing inspiration from the experiences of a variety of institutions and financial systems. Particularly relevant are those systems that have experienced forms of transition and a mix, over time, of market and state intervention.
The approach of this paper is one of institutional financial economics (Neave, 1991 and Williamson, 1986), in which structural details of financial institutions and contracts, in our case French financial institutions, are analysed. We argue that the principles on which some French financial institutions are based and aspects of their functioning are of value to reformers. We discuss the lessons that can be learnt from the Crédit National, the Commissariat Général du Plan, the CODEVI and the SOFARIS.