Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding

In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction.     

Extinction accounting and accountability: Empirical evidence from the west European tissue industry

Recently, human activities are more and more invasive with respect to biodiversity. Several studies highlighted the key role played by accountants in contributing to the development of tools able to support company in assessing, reporting, and disseminating, as well as accomplishing, the preservation of natural species and ecosystems (King and Atkins, 2016). Corporate reporting of environmental information might increase the credibility of forest certifications, given that some scholars argued that certified forests are not often run, in a sustainable way. Moreover, certifications sometimes cover harmful forest practices (Elad, 2014) and do not ensure a good quality of environmental reporting and performance. The research question therefore intends to explore how extinction accounting and accountability (EAA) is able to reflect ex post the company's business strategy and, at the same time, influence ex ante its formulation by easing the prevention of deforestation risk and addressing the issue of credibility through specific actions. In more detail, the “Emancipatory Framework for Extinction Accounting and Accountability” (EFEAA) (Atkins and Maroun, 2018) was tested using content and interpretative analyses based on the reports inherent to top four companies working in West Europe in the tissue industry, where the preservation of forest heritage is a “compulsory route” for assuring the business sustainability, in terms of both raw material renewal and brand reputation. The findings highlighted the first attempt to carry out a qualitative research over the management of forest issues. In our study, companies tend to report advantages arising from the use of forest, but this kind of disclosure is too generic without providing evidence over the ecosystem services forests produce. Moreover, firm size affects the quantity and the quality of disclosure. At last, managerial implications and future research avenues are outlined and discussed.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF REPUTATION IN AWARDING PUBLIC CONTRACTS

ABSTRACT * :  The main economic literature emphasizes that the efficiency of the awarding procedure depends on the contractual rules, especially those regarding firm's remuneration. In this work we show the existence of a reverse link: when the enforcement of contractual terms is imperfect, the rules of the awarding mechanism can help to improve the efficiency of the contractual relationship. In some circumstances, awarding rules based only on bids are not able to deal with the problem of opportunistic behaviour during the execution of the contract. Our model points out that the public administration can incentivize the contractor's fairness by considering not only competitors' bids, but also their different reputation.     

Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.