Moving markets? Government bond investors and microeconomic policy changes

Do sovereign bond markets react systematically to microeconomic policy reforms? Some observers suggest that investors are very attentive to supply‐side policies such as those related to labor markets, corporate taxation, and product standards. They argue that, along with macroeconomic outcomes and broad financial market conditions, such reforms affect sovereign bond premiums, for developed as well as emerging economies. In contrast, we predict few systematic effects of supply‐side policy reforms on sovereign bond market outcomes. Our theory draws on a standard three‐equation model of the economy, widely accepted among economic and finance professionals. That model makes few clear predictions regarding the anticipated effects of microeconomic policy changes; as a result, we expect that such reforms will not generate systematic market reactions. Our analyses, based on daily data from 37 countries from 2004 to 2012, indeed reveal little evidence of a systematic bond market reaction to the 47 most significant reforms to corporate taxation and labor market regulation. These results call into question the notion that “bond market vigilantes” play a central role in compelling governments to enact specific microeconomic policy changes.     

Aid, Agriculture and Poverty in Developing Countries

The authors make two contributions to the debate on aid‐effectiveness, illustrating that for impact on poverty what matters is not just the level but also the composition and stability of aid. One specific implication of this for aid policy is that aid most effectively reduces poverty if it supports public (and other) expenditures which are supportive of agricultural development. Regression analysis confirms that these are not only direct expenditure on agriculture, but also on education and infrastructure, and military expenditure has a negative impact. Three factors appear to be particularly conducive to the development of stable pro‐poor expenditure patterns (and in particular pro‐agriculture expenditure patterns). These are expenditure strategies which protect the poor against risk, the development of stable relations between governments and aid donors, and long‐term political commitment to pro‐poor strategies by government. The argument is pursued partly by panel‐data econometric analysis of developing countries as a whole, and partly by case studies of sustained and non‐sustained green revolutions in heavily aid‐dependent countries in Africa.     

Capital Controls Re‐examined: The Case for ‘Smart’ Controls

The global financial crisis which began in east Asia in 1997 is not over, neither is the inquest into its implications for adjustment policy. In the wake of this crisis, we focus here on the role of capital controls, which formed a much publicised part of the crisis‐coping strategy in one country (Malaysia) and, less openly, were also deployed by other crisis‐afflicted countries. Evaluation so far has examined different target variables with different estimation methods, generally concentrating on efficiency and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures; it has also typically treated ‘control’ as a one‐zero dummy variable, ignoring the ‘quality’ of intervention and in particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls. Partly because of these limitations, the literature has reached no consensus on the impact of controls; however, it is moving over towards acknowledging that the quality and type of controls is important, as well as their intensity. We propose an approach in which the government plays off short‐term political security against long‐term economic gain; the more insecure its political footing, the greater the weight it gives to political survival, which is likely to increase the probability of controls being imposed. The modelling of this approach generates a governmental ‘policy reaction function’ and an impact function for controls, which are estimated by simultaneous panel‐data methods across a sample of thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980–2003, using, for the period since 1996, the ‘new’ IMF dataset which differentiates between controls by type. We find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality, and are significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness to trade. They do not, in our analysis, materially influence the level of whole‐economy productivity or GDP across the sample of countries examined, although they do influence productivity in particular sectors. But the dispersion around this central finding is wide: the tendency for controls to depress productivity by encouraging rent‐seeking sometimes is, and sometimes is not, counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness. Whether or not this happens is vital, on both efficiency and equity grounds. We make the case for ‘smart’ capital controls – controls which are time‐limited and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity.     

The IMF After the Asian Crisis: Merits and Limitations of the ‘Long‐term Development Partner’ Role

We examine the view, espoused by a number of commentators in recent months, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should seek to withdraw from its long‐term lending operations, in the wake of the recent financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere, and restrict itself to its ‘core competency’ of preventing and where necessary lending into financial crisis. This view is based on a belief that such long‐term lending crowds out both private sector operations and short‐term IMF lending; and that it is ineffective, because of weaknesses in the IMF’s conditionality. Both of these propositions, we argue, can be challenged. In the poorer developing countries there is virtually no private sector to crowd out, and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) operations have been conspicuously successful, not only at promoting growth, but also at achieving structural changes not at all achieved by aid donors such as strengthening the tax base. Such changes inevitably require a longer time‐period than the standard three years of an IMF standby, not only in order to induce a production response but also in order to achieve the necessary measure of stabilisation and economic reform without imposing social pressures which wreck the production response. The latter argument is particularly powerful in middle income countries, and provides an argument for IMF support to these countries also whilst they are temporarily excluded from international capital markets. Often also a long‐term presence is needed to achieve effective leverage in short‐term operations. In such cases the IMF’s long‐term lending should be seen as preconditional to the success of, and not as an alternative to, its short‐term operations. We therefore argue for the retention of the Fund’s long‐term lending function; and for this function not to be transferred to the World Bank, which has less credibility in global financial markets and less comparative advantage in macro‐economic management. Measures are indeed needed to reduce the level of the IMF’s exposure to risk in poorer developing countries, but those, we believe, should consist of the preventive measures currently going on, and measures to increase the ratio of equity to debt, rather than measures which would jeopardise the progress in long‐term poverty alleviation capacity achieved by the Fund over recent years     

The Southern African customs union: A reappraisal

The paper attempts to evaluate, as far as possible quantitatively, the costs and benefits to the countries of the ‘Southern African periphery’ (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) of participation with South Africa in the current customs union agreement. On balancing the agreement's measurable effects (on industrial development, exports, government revenue and the cost of living) against one another, it appears that on sanguine assumptions only, there would be a substantial benefit to Botswana and a much more moderate benefit to Lesotho if the customs union were dismantled and replaced by separately protected national markets. Such a calculation, however, neglects what may be the most important benefit and cost to the ‘peripheral’ countries of leaving the customs union, namely the increase of ‘economic independence’ and the risk of South African retaliation respectively: themes which are explored in the final section.     

Hedging its Bets: The UK and the Politics of European Financial Services Regulation

Some argue that European financial services regulation is witnessing a shift from a ‘market-making’ to a ‘market-shaping’ paradigm after the global financial crisis. This so-called ‘new’ political economy explanation stresses the role of ideas to understand this change. We consider this claim by providing an in-depth examination of recent European hedge fund legislation from the perspective of two key ‘market-making’ coalition members: the UK government and the hedge fund industry. We accept that the legislation represents a set-back for the ‘market-makers’ but question whether it represents a victory for the ‘market-shapers’. Moreover, we cast doubt on the causal role of ideas, calling for a domestic politics approach.     

Can Micro Health Insurance Reduce Poverty? Evidence From Bangladesh

This article examines the impact of micro health insurance on poverty reduction in rural areas of Bangladesh. The research is based on household‐level primary data collected from the operating areas of the Grameen Bank during 2006. A number of outcome measures are considered; these include household income, stability of household income via food sufficiency and ownership of nonland assets, and the probability of being above or below the poverty line. The results show that micro health insurance has a positive association with all of these indicators, and this is statistically significant and quantitatively important for food sufficiency.