U.S. International Equity Investment

Using a comprehensive data set of all U.S. investment in foreign equities, we find that the single most important determinant of the amount of U.S. investment a foreign firm receives is whether the firm cross‐lists on a U.S. exchange. Correcting for selection biases, cross‐listing leads to a doubling (or more) in U.S. investment, an impact greater than all other factors combined. Much of this increased U.S. investment is purchased in the foreign market, implying that the cross‐listing effect reflects something more fundamental about a firm than easier acquisition of its securities. We also demonstrate that cross‐listing is an important determinant of U.S. international investment at the country level and describe easy‐to‐implement methods for including a cross‐listing variable as an endogenous control.     

ALCOHOL REGULATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TOWARDS CHILDREN

In recent years, economists have paid much attention to the demand for alcohol and the negative externalities associated with excessive drinking. Largely ignored in the literature is the link between alcohol use and domestic violence. Given the established positive relationship between alcohol consumption and acts of violence, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role that changes in the determinants of the demand for alcohol may play in reducing the incidence of violence aimed at children. Data on violence come from the 1976 Physical Violence in American Families survey. We estimate a model in which violent outcomes are affected by the state excise tax rate on beer; illegal drug prices, and other regulatory variables such as availability measures and laws restricting the advertising of alcohol. Results show that increasing the tax on beer can be an effective policy tool in reducing violence. Laws designed to make obtaining beer more difficult also may be effective in reducing violence, while restrictions on advertising and increases in illegal drug prices have no effects.     

The Value of Corporate Risk Management

We model and estimate the value of corporate risk management. We show how risk management can add value when revenues and costs are nonlinearly related to prices and estimate the model by regressing quarterly firm sales and costs on the second and higher moments of output and input prices. For a sample of 34 oil refiners, we find that hedging concave revenues and leaving concave costs exposed each represent between 2% and 3% of firm value. We validate our approach by regressing Tobin's q on the estimated value and level of risk management and find results consistent with the model.     

Incomplete Regulation,Competition, and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries

The paper analyzes the effects of liberalization in increasing returns to scale industries. It determines the optimal regulation of an incumbent competing with an unregulated strategic competitor, when public funds are costly. The model reveals the trade‐off between productive and allocative efficiency. Moreover, the welfare gains from liberalization, as compared with regulated monopoly, are a nonmonotonic function of the cost of public funds. Finally, in the case of severe governmental cash constraints, incomplete regulation may dominate the full regulation of duopoly.