α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

Decentralization and Economic Development: An Evolutionary Approach

There has been a growing interest in relationship between economic development and fiscal decentralization. Empirical studies, however, are not conclusive regarding their correlation or causality. The present paper aims to provide a theoretical foundation for better understanding of this issue. Developing a dynamic model, we argue that decentralization and development proceed hand in hand, interacting one another, and that the relation between them is not monotonic but evolutionary. We also show that there will exist multiple steady states and that political decision of fiscal decentralization in general fails to lead the economy to the most desirable one.