Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods

The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor-income (wage) taxes. We introduce an experimental paradigm in which individuals make real labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this paradigm to test whether a labor-income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to identical labor-leisure allocations. Despite controlling for subjects' work ability and inherent labor-leisure preferences and disallowing saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic implications of a policy shift to a consumption tax.     

Household search choice: theory and evidence

Since the work by Stigler (1961) on the economics of information in the early 1960s, economists have paid closer attention to the role of search for information. However, search methods are not considered in the theory of portfolio choice. We present a model of investor search behaviour in order to provide a framework by which to evaluate our empirical evidence on the role of search in portfolio selection and performance. We study two types of search methods: informal and professional. We show that the income, wealth and risk preference of households influence their search choice.     

On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games

How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.     

Explaining production inefficiency in China's agriculture using data envelopment analysis and semi-parametric bootstrapping

In this paper we examine more closely the factors associated with production inefficiency in China's agriculture. The approach we take involves a two-stage process where output efficiency scores are first estimated using data envelopment analysis, and then in the second stage, variation in the resulting efficiency scores is explained using a truncated regression model with inference based on a semi-parametric bootstrap routine. Among the results we find that a heavy industrial presence is associated with reduced agricultural production efficiency and may be an indication that externalities from the industrial process, such as air and ground water pollution, affect agricultural production. We also find evidence that counties with a large percentage of the rural labor force engaged in agriculture tend to be less efficient, and suggests that nurturing and promoting growth of non-primary agriculture may lead to more efficient use of labor resources in agriculture.     

Stock market bubble effects on mergers and acquisitions

We investigate if and how mergers and acquisitions are affected by trends in the capital market, and particularly by a stock market bubble. Our main findings indicate that while the prevalence of M&A increased during the technology bubble, the pricing of M&A did not change. Moreover, the bursting of the bubble seems to have led to further cautiousness by investors, which extended throughout the years subsequent to the bursting of the bubble, even when prices on the exchange had rebounded. While we do not find robust evidence for changes in price multiples outside the exchange in concomitance with the changes on the exchange, we document changes in the information used by investors to value their targets. It seems that investors experienced a learning process in terms of the type of variables preferred, appearing to be more cautious since the bubble burst. This learning process investors undergo in concomitance to processes in the market seems to result in their being less affected by periodical or cyclical sentiments of euphoria and depression in the capital market.     

Discrimination in contests: a survey

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive answer to some fundamental questions related to discrimination within the context of contests. For example, what forms of discrimination are possible? Can discrimination be justified? What mode of discrimination is expected? Does discrimination necessarily result in the elimination of polarization? How effective are the different modes of discrimination in inducing efforts (revenue)? How do the most widely studied contests based on an all-pay-auction and on a lottery compare under different modes of discrimination? Applying a contest-design approach, we examine four alternative types of discrimination that can be selected by a contest designer who maximizes the contestants’ efforts (his revenue). Our survey focuses on the leading principles of the separate and joint effective application of the alternative modes of direct, overt covert and head starts-discrimination that are assumed to be exercised under the widely studied family of (logit) contest success functions (CSFs). Whereas direct discrimination refers to differential taxation of the contested prize subject to a balanced-budget constraint, overt, covert and head starts-discrimination relate to structural discrimination that involves the parameters of the CSF. While the direct mode of discrimination is legally feasible, the structural modes of discrimination are more subtle and more difficult to implement and, sometimes, may even involve legal barriers.     

Lotteries vs. All‐Pay Auctions in Fair and Biased Contests

The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This article establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock‐type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all‐pay‐auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the designer's payoff under the optimal lottery is equal to his expected payoff under the optimal all‐pay auction.     

Trademark infringement and optimal monitoring policy

The paper addresses a trademark infringer who seeks to capitalize on the reputation of a trademark owner, sells an identical product under a trademark which is confusingly similar to that of the owner, charges the same price and competes with him in the same market. We show that the welfare-maximizing monitoring intensity is zero, hence the government is not likely to engage in monitoring infringement. Recognizing this, the trademark owner may consider monitoring the market himself, discovering, however, that this is worth his while only if the penalty for infringement, which he fully collects, is sufficiently high. Given the entry condition, an increase in the penalty may either raise or lower the optimal monitoring intensity. In the former case it will counter-intuitively increase the infringer's expected profit, apparently because a higher penalty will also lead to a raise in price. While monitoring enables the trademark owner to maintain a positive profit level, it reduces social welfare. The government may intervene to eliminate the private incentive for monitoring through taxing the collected penalty.