Consistent inference in fixed-effects stochastic frontier models

The classical stochastic frontier panel data models provide no mechanism to disentangle individual time invariant unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Greene (2005a, b) proposed the so-called “true” fixed-effects specification that distinguishes these two latent components. However, due to the incidental parameters problem, his maximum likelihood estimator may lead to biased variance estimates. We propose two alternative estimators that achieve consistency for $n\to \infty$ with fixed $T$. Furthermore, we extend the Chen et al. (2014) results providing a feasible estimator when the inefficiency is heteroskedastic and follows a first-order autoregressive process. We investigate the behavior of the proposed estimators through Monte Carlo simulations showing good finite sample properties, especially in small samples. An application to hospitals’ technical efficiency illustrates the usefulness of the new approach.     

The income elasticity gap and its implications for economic growth and tourism development: the Balearic vs the Canary Islands

ABSTRACT

The Balearic and the Canary Islands are two well-known tourism-led economies. They both experienced a tourism boom during the same decades, and, hence, they developed a similar productive-mix. Nevertheless, there are strong economic differences between the two regions. While the Balearic Islands enjoy a high GDP per capita, the Canary Islands show a more modest performance. The results of a panel data regression confirm our hypothesis that they differ substantially in terms of income elasticity of tourism. It is two times higher in the Balearic Islands than in the Canaries, which indicates the first is perceived as a more luxurious destination. Furthermore, the results of a dynamic computable general equilibrium model show that the Canaries would converge in GDP per capita with the Balearic Islands if they attracted tourists with a similar profile as the latter.     

Difference‐in‐differences when the treatment status is observed in only one period

This paper considers the difference‐in‐differences (DID) method when the data come from repeated cross‐sections and the treatment status is observed either before or after the implementation of a program. We propose a new method that point‐identifies the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) via a DID method when there is at least one proxy variable for the latent treatment. Key assumptions are the stationarity of the propensity score conditional on the proxy and an exclusion restriction that the proxy must satisfy with respect to the change in average outcomes over time conditional on the true treatment status. We propose a generalized method of moments estimator for the ATT and we show that the associated overidentification test can be used to test our key assumptions. The method is used to evaluate JUNTOS, a Peruvian conditional cash transfer program. We find that the program significantly increased the demand for health inputs among children and women of reproductive age.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

The asymmetric effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade and offshoring decisions

This paper studies the effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade. Building on the Antràs and Helpman (2004) North–South theoretical framework, I show that higher Northern tariffs reduce the incentives for outsourcing and offshoring, while higher Southern tariffs have the opposite effects. I also show that increased offshoring and outsourcing imply a decrease in the ratio of Northern intra-firm imports to total imports, an empirically testable prediction. Using a highly disaggregated dataset of U.S. (the North) imports and relevant U.S. and foreign tariffs, I find robust evidence to support the model's predictions.     

Promoting Persistent Strategic Reasoning Behavior: An Experimental Approach

The present research is aimed to apply experimental techniques to study strategic behavior in one-shot-hide-and-seek games as a frame to elicit more real and elaborated business situations. To promote strategic thinking and persistence, we conducted treatments with repeated matching games among strangers, and one of them with a fixed endowment (fixed initial payment that decreases each round an amount) with the possibility of abandon in any round, retaining the remaining of endowment. In fact, effortful strategic reasoning is found in deviation of subjects’ random choices along the repetitions and abandon, loss aversion, and cultural differences seem articulate a strategic behavior.     

Collusion and heterogeneity of firms

We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, with or without capacity constraints. Next, we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long‐run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria. In the long run, the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market.     

THE THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES

Most market structures are neither perfectly or monopolistically competitive: they are characterized by a few large firms that are engaged in strategic interactions in their production and investment decisions and whose number is endogenous. The theory of endogenous market structures analyzes markets in partial and general equilibrium where strategies affect entry and entry affects strategies, and exogenous primitive conditions on technology and preferences affect the equilibrium. We discuss applications to industrial organization, international trade, business cycle theory, international finance, growth and implications for welfare and for competition, trade, fiscal and monetary policy.