Endogenous codetermination

This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.     

Co-presence and mobile apps: Technology's impact on being with others

Despite a lack of theoretical understanding regarding how consumers react when using mobile applications in a store, the latter are being used more and more often in shared consumption areas. This research explores the impact that using a mobile application has on perceptions of co-presence. Depending on the consumption experience stage, this technological tool can be a social facilitator that enhances interactions with companions or a device that makes it possible to reduce a negative crowd impression. This paper is positioned at the intersection of interpersonal influence research and research focused on mobile technologies' effect on the purchasing process. It may interest managers of sites where there is high co-presence and where a mobile application might reduce negative crowd impressions and facilitate in-group sharing.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

A model of growth with inherited tastes

This research aims at studying a general equilibrium closed economy with overlapping generations and inherited tastes (aspirations), as in de la Croix (Econ Lett 53(1):89–96, 1996). It shows that the interaction between the intensity of aspirations and the elasticity of substitution of effective consumption affects the qualitative and quantitative long-term dynamics from both local and global perspectives. The related literature is extended by showing that (1) the Neimark–Sacker bifurcation found by de la Croix (1996) does not necessarily give rise to fluctuations and (2) endogenous (long-lasting) fluctuations occur through the emergence of period-doubling bifurcations.     

Economic growth and stability with public pay-as-you-go pensions and private intra-family old-age insurance

This paper compares the steady-state and dynamic outcomes of two historical alternatives as a means of old-age insurance, namely, voluntary intra-family transfers from young to old members versus pay-as-you-go public pensions, in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with children as a desirable good. We show that the shift from a private system of old-age support to public pensions increases the gross domestic product (GDP) per worker. Moreover, although in both cases the steady-state stock of capital, under myopic expectations, may be (globally) unstable depending on the size of the inter-generational transfer, we show that the existence of public pensions rather than private intra-family gifts considerably reduces the possibility of cyclical instability.     

America's Engagement in Iraq: Insights and implications for public management research

Abstract

There are lessons to be learned in the matter of public management in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the importance of the management cultures in which decisions are made. This review is of four books, by different authors, sharing their journalist approach. Four shared themes emerge from these works: the importance of training, organizational culture, strategy, and governance. The authors develop an awareness of the inter-connectivity of the leadership and management cultures of the military and civilians, with significant implications for future public management research. Each of the four books in this review offers contributions that extend the knowledge and practice of public management and public policy, providing hard-learned lessons that can be cross walked into teaching, practice, and research.     

Child policy ineffectiveness in an overlapping generations small open economy with human capital accumulation and public education

Motivated by the recent decrease in the number of children experienced in several developed countries, in this paper we consider a small open economy model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and human capital formation through public education, and look at the role the government can play in affecting fertility through the widely used child allowance policy. Contrary to conventional view, we show that the public provision of child allowances is fertility-neutral in the long run, that is it is not effective as a pro-natalist policy, while also reducing human capital accumulation. In contrast, the financing of the public education system is beneficial to both fertility and human capital. These results hold in the cases of both fixed and time cost of children.