Signaling in science-based IPOs: The combined effect of affiliation with prestigious universities,underwriters, and venture capitalists

This paper studies the combined effect of affiliation with prestigious universities, underwriters, and venture capitalists on the valuation of biotech ventures at IPO and their post-IPO performance. We argue that affiliation to a prestigious university provides the affiliated firm with a quality signal in the scientific domain. The pure quality signaling effect of the affiliation is isolated from the substantive benefits it provides by performing a difference-in-difference approach based on the scientific reputation of scientists in firms' upper echelons. The signal is stronger the weaker is the scientific reputation of scientists of the focal IPO-firm and is additive to those provided by prestigious venture capitalists and underwriters. Results for a sample of 254 European biotech ventures that went through an IPO between 1990 and 2009 confirm our predictions.     

Equalizing tax bases or tax revenues under tax competition? The role of formula apportionment

This paper contributes to the literature on fiscal equalization and corporate tax competition. The innovation is that we explicitly model multinational enterprises and a corporate tax system that is designed according to formula apportionment. Two main results are obtained. First, in contrast to previous studies we identify cases where tax revenue equalization is better in mitigating detrimental tax competition than tax base equalization. Second, tax base equalization nevertheless has the advantage that it may render tax rates efficient, depending on the shape of the apportionment formula. A pure payroll formula does not ensure efficiency, but a back‐of‐the‐envelope calibration of our model to Canadian provinces suggests that a pure sales formula may be optimal.     

Exploring the contribution of innovation intermediaries to the new product development (NPD) process: a typology and an empirical study

In the ‘knowledge economy’ upheld by the European Lisbon strategy, knowledge‐intensive services are considered a key driver for innovation and competitiveness. A category of knowledge‐intensive services that has become of utmost importance in the last few decades is new product development (NPD) services, which interconnect distant knowledge domains with the client firms. In addition to NPD service providers, web‐based innovation intermediaries have started to help innovative firms access dispersed bodies of knowledge. Despite the heterogeneity of their characteristics, however, a clear typology of the strategies used by traditional NPD service providers and web‐based intermediaries to interact with their knowledge sources and with their clients is missing. This typology would be very useful for those firms that are willing to collaborate with innovation intermediaries because it could highlight the typologies of NPD problems different intermediaries are apt to address and the managerial challenges that working with them entails. Developing such a classification framework is the main goal of this paper. The typology proposed in this paper suggests that innovation intermediaries should be distinguished based on the following: (1) the way they access their distributed knowledge sources and (2) the way they deliver value to their clients. By combining these two dimensions, four categories of innovation intermediaries are identified, which are named brokers, mediators, collectors and connectors. A multiple case study analysis involving four innovation intermediaries and 12 of their clients is presented in the paper. The analysis provides exploratory insights into (1) the typologies of NPD problems that each class of intermediaries addresses and (2) the managerial challenges that working with each of them entails. These preliminary findings call for further theoretical and empirical research into the complex interaction among innovation intermediaries, their dispersed sources of knowledge and their clients.     

Licensing Under Bertrand Competition Revisited

This note indicates that the derivation of the royalty contract for licensing in Wang and Yang (Australian Economic Papers, 39 (1999) 106–119) is not correct. As a consequence, the profits of the innovator in the case of royalty licensing are underestimated.     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

When do thick venture capital markets foster innovation? An evolutionary analysis

In this paper, we examine the trade off between different effects of the availability of venture capital on the speed of technological progress in an industry. We consider an evolutionary industry simulation model based on Nelson and Winter (1982), in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate technological know-how embodied in key R&D employees, who might use this know-how to found a spinoff of the incumbent. Venture capital is needed to finance a spinoff, so that the expected profits from founding a spinoff depend on how easily venture capital can be acquired. Accordingly, thick venture capital markets might have two opposing effects. First, incentives of firms to invest in R&D might be reduced and, second, if spinoff formation results in technological spillovers between the parent firm and the spinoffs, the generation of spinoff firms might positively influence the future efficiency of the incumbent’s innovation efforts. We study the manner in which this tradeoff influences the effect of venture capital on innovation expenditures, speed of technological change and evolution of industry concentration in several scenarios with different industry characteristics.     

A MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION WITH PERSONAL INCOME DISPERSION

We introduce non‐homothetic preferences in the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, and enquire about the effects of a change in income dispersion on the firms’ optimal decisions and market equilibrium. Income dispersion, modeled as a mean preserving spread, is shown to affect only the degree of product differentiation under the standard negligibility hypothesis on the firms’ decision making process, while it generates a positive co‐movement of demand and demand elasticity, when this assumption is removed and the price index effect is taken into account.     

Accounting for Negative,Zero and Positive Willingness to Pay for Landscape Change in a National Park

In contingent valuation, despite the fact that many externalities manifest themselves as costs to some and benefits to others, most studies restrict willingness to pay to being non‐negative. In this paper, we investigate the impact of allowing for negative, zero and positive preferences for prospective changes in woodland cover in two UK national parks, the Lake District and the Trossachs. An extended spike model is used to accomplish this. The policy implications of not allowing for negative values in terms of aggregate benefits are also investigated, by comparing the extended spike model with a simple spike making use of only zero and positive bids, and a model which considers positive bids only. We find that ignoring negative values over‐states the aggregate benefits of a woodland planting project by up to 44%.     

Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration*

In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game‐theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive two‐way trade. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti‐competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under price competition, the likelihood of collusive trade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trade liberalization to be pro‐competitive. Furthermore, we show that economic integration may increase the scope for collusion irrespective of the firms’ strategic variable.     

The implementation and structuring of divestitures: the unit's perspective

Existing literature on value creation of divestitures focuses on their antecedents, typically relating them to the parent company's financial performance. Whether and how divestitures can create value for the divested unit remains unclear. This paper presents an exploratory study based on multiple cases, to examine which factors of the implementation and structuring of a divestiture may increase the performance of a divested unit. The emergent granular framework consists of previously unreported aspects of the divesting process and provides new insights into divestitures and their outcomes. Results indicate that antecedents alone may be insufficient for understanding the outcomes of divestitures. Different combinations of understanding of the rationale for the divestiture and perceived capabilities in the divesting process affect perceptions of divestiture feasibility. Sense of opportunity emerges as the key element of the divesting process for the success of divested units. Factors that participate with sense of opportunity in determining the success of divested units are further considered in the theoretical framework. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.