Who gets the job? First-generation college students' perceptions of employer screening methods

What are first-generation college students' (FGCS) perspectives of employment screening methods? The authors investigate which methods FGCS believe are likely to cause an employer to extend a job offer and which methods yield the best pool of job applicants. Survey data were collected from undergraduate business majors. They were analyzed using means comparisons and bivariate correlation t tests. FGCS perceived resumes and interviews as most likely to help applicants get hired. Implications are discussed.     

Understanding Social Welfare Capitalism,Private Property,and the Government’s Duty to Create a Sustainable Environment

No one would deny that sustainability is necessary for individual, business, and national survival. How this goal is to be accomplished is a matter of great debate. In this article I will show that the United States and other developed countries have a duty to create sustainable cities, even if that is against a notion of private property rights considered as an absolute. Through eminent domain and regulation, developed countries can fulfill their obligations to current and future generations. To do so, the governments must reject perfectly competitive free market capitalism and the absolute right to private property, and more fully adopt social welfare capitalism as their economic system. The result will be a sustainable society that balances democracy, individual rights and individual flourishing with the community’s flourishing.     

Asymmetric information, financial intermediation, and business cycles

Summary. This incorporates a debt contracting problem with asymmetric information into a standard monetary business cycle model. The model incorporates a limited participation assumption in order to induce a liquidity effect of monetary shocks and propagate monetary disturbances. The model economy shows that a positive money supply shock generates a decrease in nominal interest rates and an increase in output level. Asymmetric information amplifies the response of capital to the money supply shock, but does not propagate them in other ways. When the monetary shock is an innovation in reserve requirements, it induces a persistent response of the economy. Received: March 20, 1998; revised version: 1 April 1998     

The business cycle with nominal contracts

Summary In this paper we study the quantitative implications of nominal wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. We address this issue using a model economy based on the neoclassical growth model supplemented by the assumption that cash is needed to purchase goods. We consider a variation of the standard recursive competitive equilibrium concept that is intended to capture the important features of wage contracting. We use this equilibrium construct to address three issues. First, we consider whether monetary shocks, propagated by nominal contracts, constitute a viable alternative to technology shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. Our results suggest that, while monetary shocks and nominal rigidities succeed in causing output volatility of the required magnitude, the resulting data have properties that are inconsistent with several key features of U.S. data. Second, we consider how the behavior of the economy varies with contract length. We find that the volatility induced by both monetary and technology shocks increases sharply with contract length. Finally we consider how much rigidity would be necessary to match the volatility of U.S. output. We find that only a very small amount of rigidity would be necessary to cause output volatility of the magnitude observed.We have received helpful comments from David Chapman, Paul Gomme, Jeremy Greenwood, Gary Hansen, Michael Keane, Tim Kehoe, Lee Ohanian, Edward Prescott, and Warren Weber. The usual disclaimer applies. This research is supported in part by NSF Grant SES-8921346 and the John M. Olin Foundation.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.