Strategic consequences of being unsympathetic: For‐profit companies benefit more than individuals from focusing on responsibility

Previous research has found that consumers ascribe mental states to for‐profit companies that enable them to elicit anger more easily than sympathy. The current study applies these findings to demonstrate how this evaluative asymmetry in consumer perceptions favor different strategies for individuals and companies managing conflicts and crises. First, it is shown that the mental states consumers ascribe to for‐profit companies enable them to elicit anger and admiration more easily than sympathy. Second, due to their ability to elicit anger more easily than sympathy, it is found that in conflicts between for‐profit companies and individuals, companies are evaluated more favorably when they focus attention on which side perpetrated the most harm, while individuals are evaluated more favorably when they focus on which side was most victimized. Third, due to their ability to elicit admiration more easily than sympathy, it is found that for‐profit companies derive greater benefits than individuals do from proactively taking responsibility to resolve crises rather than deflecting responsibility through claims of victimhood. Discussion focuses on marketing applications for companies managing conflicts and crises.     

The AfD’s Winning Formula — No Need for Economic Strategy Blurring in Germany

Intereconomics - Western European Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) have addressed the dispersed socio-economic status of their electorates by blurring their economic positioning. This...     

Ausgabenspielräume der Bundesregierung: zwischen Schuldenbremse und Steuererhöhung

Wirtschaftsdienst - Die neue Bundesregierung wird zur Finanzierung neuer Ausgabenschwerpunkte nur bedingt auf eine Kreditfinanzierung ausweichen können, da nach aktuellem Stand ab 2023 wieder...     

If Nothing is Achieved: Who Pays for the Brexit?

The United Kingdom will depart from the European Union in March 2019. Numerous open questions remain about details and conditions especially with regard to post-Brexit EU-UK trade relations. In case of a negotiation failure, a “hard Brexit” could cause considerably high costs on both sides of the Channel. In the short run, companies will be charged more than 15 billion euro as tariffs. In the long run, UK-EU trade could be reduced up to 50 percent.     

Wie geht es mit dem Brexit weiter?

The UK’s 2016 EU referendum may account for great income losses in the UK. Gabriel Felbermayr et al. use a “new” quantitative trade model to assess various Brexit scenarios. The results broadly show that all EU member states lose, and the relative losses in the UK are about five times those of the average remaining EU country. These findings have important implications for the EU’s negotiation strategy. The outcome depends largely on the decisions about trade relations. Michael Hüther thinks that the UK is heading for an extremely hard Brexit and that it already shows. Therefore, the UK government should work out a consistent industrial policy and make up its mind about its preferences on its future economic relationship with its neighbours. In light of the currently very close and mutually welfare-enhancing business relations between the EU27 and the UK, one of the central tasks and challenges of the Brexit negotiations is undoubtedly the creation of a new supportive post-supranational legal framework governing these economic transactions in the future. Andreas Grimmel argues that the EU’s crises are largely the result of a certain mode of integration that is based on actors’ interests rather than on a comprehensive constitutional framework.     

Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy

Activist NGOs have increasingly foregone public politics and turned to private politics to change the practices of firms and industries. This paper focuses on private politics, activist strategies, and nonmarket strategies of targets. A formal theory of an encounter between an activist organization and a target is presented to examine strategies for lessening the chance of being a target and for addressing an activist challenge once it has occurred. The encounter between the activist and the target is viewed as competition. At the heart of that competition is an activist campaign, which is represented by a demand, a promised reward if the target meets the demand, and a threat of harm if the target rejects the demand. The model incorporates target selection by the activist, proactive measures and reputation building by a potential target to reduce the likelihood of being selected as a target, fighting a campaign, and credible commitment.     

Brexit und die Zukunft Europas – eine spieltheoretische Einordnung

After the Brexit referendum’s leave outcome last summer, the new relationship between the UK and the EU has to be shaped institutionally. For the two bargaining parties the question now is which negotiation strategy to take. In order to choose the optimal strategy, the players have to factor in their time preferences. A game theoretical approach yields that the EU — no matter what is economically feasible in the short run — has to play a tough negotiation strategy if they care about the long run. This result is not a question of punishment but of pure economic rationale.