Non-rating revenue and conflicts of interest

Rating agencies produce ratings used by investors, but obtain most of their revenue from issuers, leading to a conflict of interest. We employ a unique data set on the use of non-rating services, and the associated payments, in India, to test if this conflict affects ratings quality. Agencies rate issuers that pay them for non-rating services higher (than agencies not hired for such services). Such issuers also have higher default rates. Both effects are increasing in the amount paid. These results suggest that issuers which hire agencies for non-rating services receive higher ratings despite having higher default risk.     

A Perpetual Race to Stay Ahead

This paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity. The state of competition—measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms—evolves stochastically according to their effort level. The structure of Markov perfect equilibria is identified. It is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest. Rather, firms invest under two distinct circumstances: while sufficiently ahead, to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership; while behind, to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them.     

Minimum and preferred entry qualifications and training provision for North Australian workers

This paper reports on the outcomes of a replication study of a survey of British employers that requested information on the qualifications sought when recruiting employees and on subsequent training and development. While the British survey was interested in the uptake and use of the British National Vocational Qualifications, the study reported in this article is primarily focused on the uptake and use of the Australian Qualifications Framework qualifications by North Australian employers. This study was prompted by the skills shortages and recruitment difficulties being experienced by organizations throughout rural and regional Australia. Previous studies have found that vocational qualifications were not valued by UK employers and few employers were encouraging employees to undertake vocational awards. If this is also the case in Australia, it may in part explain problems in recruiting skilled workers. This research clearly demonstrates that employees in regional and rural Australia are seeking to improve their knowledge and skills through vocational training and higher education qualifications. Also, employers are providing access to training and are supporting managerial and professional employees to gain higher educational qualifications. When recruiting all types of worker other than unskilled labourers, the majority of organizations prefer to recruit workers with qualifications. In rural and regional centres, however, a more pragmatic stance of recruiting unqualified employees in some areas is observed. Clearly, employers will attempt to minimize training costs by recruiting skilled employees, but in the end they will have to provide access to training and education to ensure that they have a skilled workforce that can deliver essential services and products.     

Introducing Time‐to‐Educate in a Job‐Search Model

Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemployment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market. At the same time, education is a time‐consuming process, and enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by means of job‐search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job. Standard models of job search and education assume that skills can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on‐the‐job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a time‐consuming process, a concept which we call time‐to‐educate, during which an individual faces the trade‐off between continuing education and taking up a job.     

Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing

Abstract .  Grossman and Helpman (1994) explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72–75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government.     

MOTIVATING RECYCLING: A MARGINAL COST ANALYSIS

Areas considering alternative house-to-house recycling programs as a means of diverting material from landfills can determine the most efficient choice by comparing programs' marginal costs with diversion's marginal benefits. This paper describes a controlled field experiment that observed individual household recycling habits over a six-month period. The experiment monitored the quantity of material that households recycled under increasingly more convenient (and increasingly more costly) programs. The analysis here uses a Tobit model to determine how the quantity of material diverted varies as a function of convenience factors and demographic characteristics. The analysis compares the value of the expected marginal increase in diversion to the marginal cost of increasing recycling convenience to determine the efficient level of convenience for an area's recycling program.