Did going public impair Moody׳s credit ratings?

We investigate a prominent allegation in congressional hearings that Moody?s loosened its rating standards to chase revenue after it went public in 2000. Consistent with this allegation, Moody?s ratings for both corporate bonds and structured finance products are significantly more favorable to issuers, relative to S&P?s, after Moody?s IPO. Moreover, Moody?s ratings are more favorable for clients subject to greater conflict of interest. There is little evidence that Moody?s higher ratings, post-IPO, are more informative, measured as expected default frequencies (EDFs) or as the probability of default. Our findings inform the debate on whether financial gatekeepers should be publicly traded.     

债券评级机构变更——基于评级选购与评级迎合视角

本文以2008年至2017年的公司债券为样本,研究了发行人变更评级机构的影响,以此来解释评级市场上发行人频繁变更评级机构的现象。本文发现发行人变更评级机构后,其信用等级得到显著提升。发行人变更评级机构的行为对信用等级的影响在以下两种情形中更显著:一是当发行人所处行业或评级机构所在的评级市场竞争激烈时;二是当发行人主体评级位于AA信用等级的临界点时。进一步研究发现,考虑到评级机构变更与信用等级之间的交互影响,变更评级机构的发行人整体上可实现发债成本的降低。但该类发行人未来的违约风险增加、经营业绩下降。最后,本文发现债券发行规模较大以及非国有发行人更倾向于变更评级机构来提高信用等级。本文通过分析发行人更换信用评级机构的动机和后果,为监管部门构建以评级质量为导向的良性竞争环境提供借鉴参考。     

The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults

This paper assesses biases in credit ratings and lead–lag relationships for near-to-default issuers with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P. Based on defaults from 1997 to 2004, we find evidence that Moody’s seems to adjust its ratings to increasing default risk in a timelier manner than S&P. Second, credit ratings by the two US-based agencies are not subject to any home preference. Third, given a downgrade (upgrade) by the first rating agency, subsequent downgrades (upgrades) by the second rating agency are of greater magnitude in the short term. Fourth, harsher rating changes by one agency are followed by harsher rating changes in the same direction by the second agency. Fifth, rating changes by the second rating agency are significantly more likely after downgrades than after upgrades by the first rating agency. Additionally, we find evidence for serial correlation in rating changes up to 90 days subsequent to the rating change of interest after controlling for rating changes by the second rating agency.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

Can rating agencies look through the cycle?

Rating agencies claim to look through the cycle when assigning corporate credit ratings, which entails that they are able to separate trend components of default risk from transitory ones. To test whether agencies possess this competence, I take market-based estimates of 1-year default probabilities of corporate bond issuers and estimate their long-run trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, local regression, or centered moving averages. I find that ratings help identify the current split into trend and cycle. In addition, rating stability is similar to the one of hypothetical ratings based on long-term trends. The results are robust to the use of different filter techniques. They are confirmed by a model-free analysis, which shows that ratings predict future changes in market-based default probability estimates. Since the examined trends are forward-looking in the sense that the trend filtering algorithms use future data, agency ratings exhibit important characteristics one would expect from ratings that see through the cycle.     

Market-implied ratings and their divergence from credit ratings

In this article, we investigate the divergence between credit ratings (CRs) and Moody's market-implied ratings (MIRs). Our evidence shows that rating gaps provide incremental information to the market regarding issuers' default risk over CRs alone in the short horizon and outperform CRs over extended horizons. The predictive ability of rating gaps is greater for more opaque and volatile issuers. Such predictability was more pronounced during the 2008 financial crisis but weakened in the post–Dodd–Frank Act period. This finding is consistent with credit rating agencies’ efforts to improve their performance when facing regulatory pressure. Moreover, our analysis identifies rating-gap signals that do (do not) lead to subsequent Moody's actions to place issuers on negative outlook and watchlists. We find that negative signals from MIR gaps have a real economic impact on issuers’ fundamentals such as profitability, leverage, investment, and default risk, thus supporting the recovery-efforts hypothesis.     

Understanding credit ratings quality: Evidence from UK debt market participants

This study seeks to identify: (i) the demand for corporate bond ratings provided by credit ratings agencies (CRAs); (ii) how issuers select CRAs; and (iii) to better understand ratings quality, a term widely used by commentators, politicians and regulators, but under-explored in the academic literature. Interviews identify the principal source of demand for rating information is to reduce agency conflicts between issuers and investors. Issuers typically engage between one and three credit ratings agencies to rate their debt, implying a heterogeneous demand for ratings services, and different levels of ratings quality. However, ratings quality extends beyond competence and independence to include factors relating to professional judgment, communication, transparency, and the quality and continuity of analytic staff. Findings were discussed in the light of the ongoing international policy debate concerning CRAs.     

Political similarities in credit ratings

We investigate whether political similarities between credit rating agencies (CRAs) and bond issuers impact credit rating quality. We find that a higher degree of similarity of political affiliation leads to a decrease in timeliness and accuracy of downgrades prior to default events. Our finding supports the notion that CRAs tend to maintain/assign preferential ratings to politically similar firms via delaying negative signals as favourable rating activities. We further show that these politically similar firms tend to increase the proportion of donations to their favoured party following favourable credit ratings. Interestingly, this result is confined to Republican-leaning firms. The results indicate that CRAs successfully use biased credit ratings as an indirect channel of political party support. Our findings support the political similarities in credit ratings hypothesis.     

Competition in the credit rating Industry: Benefits for investors and issuers

We empirically investigate the benefits of multiple ratings not only at issuance of debt instruments but also during the subsequent monitoring phase. Using a record of monthly credit rating migration data on all U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities rated by Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch between 1985 and 2012 (154,600 tranches), our results provide empirical evidence that rating agencies put more effort in rating and outlook revisions when tranches have assigned multiple ratings. Furthermore, we see that in the case of multiple ratings, agencies do a better job in discriminating tranches with respect to default risk. On the downside, we observe a shift in collateral towards senior tranches and incentives for issuers to engage in rating shopping activities, but find no evidence that rating agencies exploit such behavior to attract more rating business. Our results contribute to the literature on information production of credit ratings and extend the perspective to the monitoring period after issuance.     

Relative default rates on corporate loans and bonds

We use two alternative matched-set methodologies to examine for differences in loan and bond default rates among US non-financial corporate issuers. Under both methodologies, the data indicate that loan default rates are roughly 20% lower than the bond default rates due to issuers that default on their bonds but avoid bankruptcy and avoid defaulting on their loans. For a small number of European issuers, the data suggest a similar reduction in loan default rates relative to bond default rates. However, the European results differ qualitatively from the US results, due likely to differences in US and European bankruptcy regimes, as well as the larger role of bank debt on most European issuers’ balance sheets. These results have important implications for investors, bank supervisors, and rating agencies that assess the relative expected credit losses on loans versus bonds.     

Initial credit ratings and earnings management

Credit rating agencies assert that they rely on financial information provided by issuers and that they value rating stability as well as accuracy. In an environment where rating agencies depend on issuer-reported information and are reluctant to adjust ratings promptly, managers of issuing firms can utilize the discretion afforded by GAAP to obtain the most favorable credit ratings. Consistent with our expectations, we find that current accruals are unusually positive and high around initial credit ratings. The increase in abnormally high accruals leading up to the initial credit rating year is followed by a reversal in the subsequent years. Multivariate regression analyses suggest that accounting accruals, abnormal current accruals in particular, are significantly positively related to initial credit ratings after controlling for several issue- and issuer-related characteristics indicative of default risk. Our results are robust to additional tests that account for endogeneity between credit ratings and earnings management, adjust for performance, and account for firms issuing debt and equity simultaneously.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

“投资人付费”vs.“发行人付费”:谁的信用评级质量更高？

本文选择2011-2015年被中债资信覆盖的发债A股上市公司作为主要研究对象,比较了“投资人付费”与“发行人付费”模式下的评级质量高低。研究发现:(1)与“发行人付费”评级相比,采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级显著更低。(2)与“发行人付费”评级相比,当采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级越低时,发行人未来盈利能力越差、预期违约风险越高,投资者要求的风险补偿也越高,这表明“投资人付费”模式下的信用评级质量更高。(3)“发行人付费”模式的评级结果可以在一定程度上反映公司的内部私有信息,但由于同时存在独立性缺失问题,“发行人付费”模式的信用评级质量仍然不如“投资人付费”模式的信用评级质量,这说明独立性对于评级机构尤其重要。     

A simple continuous measure of credit risk

This paper introduces a simple parameterization for the risk-neutral default probability distributions for risky firms that are easily computed from quoted bond prices. The corresponding expected times to default have a particularly simple form and are proposed as a measure for credit risk. Being continuous in nature, times to default provide a much finer measure of risk than those provided by ratings agencies. Comparison with the ratings provided by Moody's and the distance to default measures calculated using the Merton [Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance, 2(2), 449-470] model shows that the highest rank correlation is found between the proposed time to default measure and Moody's ratings.     

Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond Issuers and Institutional Investors

We examine how a sample of publicly traded corporate bond issuers and institutional investors assess the four major nationally recognized rating agencies and their role in capital markets. The results show that issuers and investors differ dramatically in their assessments about rating agencies. Specifically, the majority of institutional investors require only one rating when they buy rated corporate bonds, but most issuers obtain two or more ratings. Issuers and investors also differ in their assessments about whether ratings accurately reflect creditworthiness and timeliness. The results suggest that differences reflect the different roles that rating agencies provide in the market place.     

Special Issue on Market Development and Investment Strategies in Asia

Sovereign credit rating actions have attracted considerable attention recently. This study employs a rich and unique data set of ratings from six international agencies to investigate the causes of split sovereign ratings in emerging countries. Three reasons are identified in explaining the relatively high frequency of disagreement across agencies on emerging sovereign ratings. First, rating agencies use different economic factors and different weights on those factors. Second, rating agencies disagree to a greater extent about more opaque issuers. Third, for smaller rating agencies, issuers in their "home region" tend to be more favored. The findings should be of interest to a wide range of participants in global credit markets.     

Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? Historical evidence

We test whether Standard and Poor's (S&P) assigns higher bond ratings after it switches from investor-pay to issuer-pay fees in 1974. Using Moody's rating for the same bond as a benchmark, we find that when S&P charges investors and Moody's charges issuers, S&P's ratings are lower than Moody's. Once S&P adopts issuer-pay, its ratings increase and no longer differ from Moody's. More importantly, S&P only assigns higher ratings for bonds that are subject to greater conflicts of interest, measured by higher expected rating fees or lower credit quality. These findings suggest that the issuer-pay model leads to higher ratings.     

多重信用评级与债券融资成本——来自中国债券市场的经验证据

本文揭示了多重信用评级的信息生产机制和信用认证机制,排除了“信用评级购买”假说对于多重评级动机的解释,研究发现:多重信用评级有利于降低债券融资成本;相对于不一致的多重信用评级,一致的多重信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本。在多重信用评级中,相对于评级机构均为“发行人付费”模式,兼有“投资者付费”模式的信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本。此外,当多重信用评级的评级意见不一致时,平均评级的信息含量最高,即综合不同信用评级所包含的多种信息比任何单一信用评级更加具有信息含量。本研究为我国债券市场双评级制度提供了理论和经验证据的支持,有助于完善多元化信用评级制度和债券市场监管制度,并提示发债企业可以通过多重信用评级向市场传递更多和更具效度的评级信息,以弥补单一信用评级的信息不足和评级结果失准,减少投资者决策的不确定性,从而降低债券融资成本。     

中债估值识别了债券信用风险吗？——基于跳跃视角的实证分析

本文以2011—2018年中国A股上市公司发行的一般公司债为样本,探究了中债估值跳跃对债券信用利差的影响及作用机制,以此说明中债估值对债券信用风险的识别作用。研究发现:中债估值跳跃能够显著提高债券信用利差,其中,中债估值上跳降低了信用利差,下跳提高了信用利差,且相对于上跳,下跳对信用利差的作用更大。异质性分析发现:中债估值跳跃对信用利差的作用在机构投资者中较大,同时在信息不对称性较严重、流动性较差及违约风险较高的债券中也较大。进一步研究发现:中债估值跳跃不仅包含了公共信息,还含有私有信息,并能改善股票分析师预测表现。本研究说明中债估值能够识别债券信用风险,具有信息含量,对于债券市场信息环境建设和系统性金融风险防范具有重要意义。     

金融中介机构竞争的市场反应--来自信用评级机构的证据北大核心

目前已有研究认为金融中介机构竞争会带来市场效率的提高,本文利用2012-2017年债券市场的微观数据研究“发行人付费”模式评级机构之间的竞争对评级结果的影响。研究发现,评级机构竞争会导致评级结果膨胀与评级质量下降。进一步研究发现,当评级竞争加剧时,“发行人付费”模式的评级机构会对有较多业务联系的企业放松评级标准,给予更高信用评级。我们的研究也发现评级机构的外资背景、承销商的良好声誉和媒体关注均有助于减小“发行人付费”模式下评级机构竞争的负面影响。同时,债券市场评级竞争还存在对股票市场的溢出效应,评级竞争导致的评级质量下降也降低了股票市场的信息效率。这说明,“发行人付费”模式下的评级机构竞争会降低资本市场的信息效率,“投资者付费”模式的推广和评级行业的对外开放有助于改善国内评级行业的评级质量。本文的研究也为国内债券市场进一步发挥双评级、多评级以及不同模式评级的交叉验证作用提供了一定证据支持。