Competition versus cooperation: How technology-facilitated social interdependence initiates the self-improvement chain

Consumers are increasingly using technologies such as wearables or mobile apps to achieve their self-improvement goals. Such technologies often contain features that enable social interdependence (competition or cooperation) among users to support them in improving their engagement, performance, and well-being (life satisfaction and personal growth). However, the critical question remains: does competition or cooperation best serve users in attaining these self-improvement goals? Evidence from an online experiment and a field study reveals that competition is more effective in driving performance and personal growth, while cooperation is superior in terms of behavioral engagement and life satisfaction. Furthermore, the results indicate that the effects are mediated by strive for success and fear of failure, two counteracting psychological processes. While competition is the stronger trigger for both pathways, downstream effects vary depending on the self-improvement goal considered. This research thus provides insights into whether and how users can best realize their self-improvement goals using technologies that include social features.     

Marketing messbar machen — die wirkung von empfehlungsnetzwerken auf die marketing performance

Netzwerke und Kooperationen sind entscheidende Instrumente zur Steigerung des Unternehmenswertes. Bisher haben sich Ans?tze hier auf die Unternehmensseite (Wertsch?pfungs-, Entwicklungsund Vertriebsnetzwerke) konzentriert. In jüngster Zeit rücken auch Netzwerke auf Nachfragerseite etwa in Form von Kommunikations- und Empfehlungsnetzwerken zunehmend in den Blickpunkt. Solche sozialen Netzwerke k?nnen gerade durch Marketingma?nahmen initiiert und gestaltet werden. Sie sind zentrale Stellhebel zur Steigerung der Marketing Performance und somit zur Legitimierung der Marketingfunktion.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

Tax contracts and elections

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks when in office. A government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter.