MODELING THE TERM STRUCTURE FROM THE ON‐THE‐RUN TREASURY YIELD CURVE

We propose a new model to estimate the term structure of interest rates using observed on‐the‐run Treasury yields. The new model is an improvement over models that require a priori knowledge of the shape of the yield curve to estimate the term structure. The general form of the model is an exponential function that depends on the estimation of four parameters fit by nonlinear least squares and has straightforward interpretations. In comparing the proposed model with current yield‐curve‐smoothing models, we find that, for the data used, the proposed model does best overall in terms of pricing accuracy both in sample and out of sample. JEL classification: E43, G12     

Corporate Diversification: What Gets Discounted?

Prior literature finds that diversified firms sell at a discount relative to the sum of the imputed values of their business segments. We explore this documented discount and argue that it stems from risk–reducing effects of corporate diversification. Consistent with this risk–reduction hypothesis, we find that (a) shareholder losses in diversification are a function of firm leverage, (b) all equity firms do not exhibit a diversification discount, and (c) using book values of debt to compute excess value creates a downward bias for diversified firms. Overall, the results indicate that diversification is insignificantly related to excess firm value.     

Takeover risk and the correlation between stocks and bonds

Existing research suggests that, for a given firm, stock returns and bond prices are positively related, and this implies a negative relation between stock returns and bond spreads. In this paper, we show how takeover risk influences this relation. Bondholders of high-rated firms can suffer losses in a takeover, particularly if the takeover is largely funded with debt, resulting in a more positive (or less negative) correlation between stock returns and bond spread changes. Consistent with this notion and based on a large sample of data covering the period from 1980 to 2000, we find that high-rated firms which are likely to be taken over have a more positive correlation between stock returns and bond spread changes, while target firms with a poison put or an indebtedness covenant have a more negative correlation. Overall, our findings have implications for the pricing and hedging of bonds and default risk based financial products such as credit default swaps.     

中小民营企业融资到底难在哪里——基于广东中小民营企业融资渠道的实证分析

文章从现有融资渠道及其结构状况与特点、不同资产规模企业的融资渠道结构差异比较、不同地区企业的融资渠道结构差异比较三个角度,对广东中小民营企业融资渠道的状况与特征进行实证分析。结果表明融资难问题突出表现在:短期资金融资难度降低,但长期权益性资本严重短缺;中小民营企业中做大的企业融资困难得到缓解,但其他中小企业融资仍十分困难;发达地区资金相对充足,欠发达地区中小民营企业融资困难。     

CEO turnover and bondholder wealth

We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm’s debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.     

Analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt

We examine the relation between analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt financing. Consistent with the view that the information contained in analysts’ forecasts is economically significant across asset classes, we find that analyst activity reduces bond yield spreads. We also find that the economic impact of analysts is most pronounced when uncertainty about firm value is highest (that is, when firms have high idiosyncratic risk). Our findings are robust to controls for private information in equity prices and level of corporate disclosures. Overall, the results indicate that the information contained in analyst forecasts is valued outside the equity market and provide an additional channel in which better information is associated with a lower cost of capital.     

Supply network capacity planning for semiconductor manufacturing with uncertain demand and correlation in demand considerations

A semiconductor supply network involves many expensive steps, which have to be executed to serve global markets. The complexity of global capacity planning combined with the large capital expenditures to increase factory capacity makes it important to incorporate optimization methodologies for cost reduction and long-term planning. The typical view of a semiconductor supply network consists of layers for wafer fab, sort, assembly, test and demand centers. We present a two-stage stochastic integer-programming formulation to model a semiconductor supply network. The model makes strategic capacity decisions, (i.e., build factories or outsource) while accounting for the uncertainties in demand for multiple products. We use the model not only to analyze how variability in demand affects the make/buy decisions but also to investigate how the correlation between demands of different products affects these strategic decisions. Finally, we demonstrate the value of incorporating demand uncertainty into a decision-making scheme.     

银行债权的公司治理效应研究——基于广东上市公司的实证分析

本文以市场化程度较高地区广东的企业为样本,以相对较长时期的数据为证据,将银行债权细化为短期债权和长期债权,将上市公司细分为民营公司与国有公司,对银行债权的公司治理效应展开实证研究。研究进一步证明,我国银行债权在公司治理中的独特优势没有得到发挥,近年来银行对企业的财务约束虽然在不断加强,但财务约束仍只是简单的约束机制,可能进一步加剧企业融资难问题,并不能真正实现银企双赢。研究还得到了一些新的发现:银行债权对国有公司存在"财务软约束",而对民营公司则存在"市场软约束";在金融危机爆发时,银行债权对民营公司表现出更为有利的公司治理效应,而对国有公司却相反。     

Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.