Hyperbolic Discounting,Borrowing Aversion and Debt Holding

Analysis of an original Internet‐based survey reveals that debt holding is related to time discounting through: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect in that future losses are discounted at lower rates than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Hyperbolic respondents are classified naïve if their answers reveal them to be time‐inconsistent procrastinators, and otherwise sophisticated. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more likely to be debtors. The sign effect relates negatively to borrowing. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with credit card borrowing and other overborrowing indicators.     

Broadband Demand Analysis for Network Building

An increase of broadband demand is forecasted by transitional methods that consider the effect of this increase through many factors, such as customer requirement diversification, and new service introduction and deployment under competition. Broadband demand forecasting has become important for closing the digital divide, promoting regional developments, and constructing networks economically; therefore, a demand forecast model that considers the mechanisms of market structure is necessary. In this paper, a demand analysis method for broadband access combining macro- and micro-data mining is proposed, and the service choice behaviour of customers is introduced as a customer model not only to express the macro trend of market structure, but also to consider area marketing. The proposed method can estimate the potential demand, determine the point at which broadband demand growth peaks in a specified area, and support a decision for ultra high-speed broadband access facility installation.     

When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?

We study two-person complete-information bargaining games in a non-cooperative setting. The alternating-offers model in Rubinstein (1982) is modified so that players negotiate each time about who will make the next proposal. Under this rule, there are multiple equilibria and there can be a prolonged delay. The multiplicity and the possibility of delay remain either when offers have to be made alternately (under Restriction A) or when the players cannot increase their demands over time (under Restriction N). Only when both of these restrictions are imposed does the immediate settlement predicted by Rubinstein's original model emerge as the unique equilibrium.
JEL Classification Number: C78.     

Fiscal policy,wealth divergence,and lifetime utility

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model where the less patient country decumulates and the more patient one accumulates wealth, we analyze spillover effects of lump-sum and consumption taxes. A lump-sum tax on a country definitely harms the other country through a change in the rate of interest. A lump-sum tax on either country always improves the less patient country's asset position. A consumption tax has no spillover effect, although it is Pareto-inferior. Applying these results into a closed-country context with heterogeneous agents, we also discuss policy implications of a discriminatory tax.     

LUXURY AND WEALTH*

I develop a dynamic theory of luxury consumption, particularly emphasizing the causal effect that pursuit of luxury goods has on wealth accumulation. A quasi‐luxury is defined as a good whose marginal rate of substitution is increasing in a utility index. Under certain conditions, it is indeed a luxury good. When current wealth holding falls short of (exceeds) long‐run needs, luxury consumption is postponed more (less) easily than necessity consumption, due to a lower (higher) time preference for luxury and/or a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution thereof. Preferences for quasi‐luxuries lead to a higher steady‐state value of wealth or capital.

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Strategic Investment Decisions under Uncertainty,Tacit Collusion and Product Differentiation

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty, tacit collusion and product differentiation on strategic investment policy. The model demonstrates the equilibrium under competitive investments and under cooperative investments. In competitive investments, two firms compete by investing to preempt each other, and ultimately one firm invests earlier than its rival. In cooperative investments, two firms invest simultaneously and collude on their outputs. Cooperative investments are likely to be sustainable only under conditions of high volatility of future demand, low probability of market extinction and high degree of product differentiation, while competitive investments are sustainable for any set of these parametric values.     

Market Entry,Capacity Choice,and Product Differentiation in Duopolistic Competition under Uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of pre‐emptive competition for a leader's position on the investment strategies for market entry, production capacities, and product differentiation. In the absence of pre‐emptive competition, the leader's production capacity exceeds the follower's, and the leader earns excess returns. In contrast, in its presence, the leader's production capacity decreases below the follower's, and the follower's investment value exceeds the leader's when the follower enters the market. These results suggest the new insight that pre‐emptive competition provides the opportunity for the follower to expedite investing and to enhance investment value by capitalizing on the leader's insufficient capacity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long‐term versus temporary certified emission reductions in forest carbon sequestration programs*

Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest projects can receive returns for carbon sequestration via two crediting instruments: temporary or long‐term certified emission reductions (tCERs or lCERs). This study shows the effect of lCERs on the private owner’s forest rotation intervals decision and carbon credit generation in afforestation and reforestation projects. A credit verification mechanism with a harvest penalty implemented under the lCERs policy distorts the timber harvesting decision and the corresponding carbon credit supply. Two opposing incentives are created by the lCERs mechanism which leads to either longer or shorter rotations compared to the Faustmann rotation, depending on which incentive prevails. Our numerical results show that both lCERs and tCERs seem to have similar impacts on harvesting incentives, but the resulting carbon supply differs among the instruments owing to the credit verification mechanism. The tCERs carbon supply curve is monotonically increasing in the carbon price, while a lCERs carbon supply is non‐monotonic and may have a backward bending region over a range of carbon prices.     

The Effect of Temporary Certified Emission Reductions on Forest Rotations and Carbon Supply

This paper examines the effect of the Clean Development Mechanism regulations that create temporary certified emission reductions on harvesting decisions, land use allocation, and the carbon supply in forest plantations. We develop a model that solves the landowner's harvesting decision when revenues from carbon uptake are included. Rotation intervals and carbon credit supply slightly increase. Fast growing tree species with shorter rotation intervals have relatively more inelastic carbon credit supply curves than slow growing tree species with longer rotations. With moderate carbon prices, most carbon sequestration gains originate from the extensive margin through the expansion of forest land, but approximately 22–35% of total carbon sequestered comes from the intensive margin through an increase in rotation intervals. The contribution to carbon sequestration from the intensive margin is more significant as the carbon price increases. Dans le présent article, nous avons examiné les répercussions que les règles du mécanisme pour un développement propre (MDP), qui délivre des unités de réduction certifiée des émissions temporaire (URCEt), ont sur les décisions de récolte, les changements d’utilisation des terres et l’offre de crédit de carbone dans les plantations forestières. Nous avons élaboré un modèle qui aide les propriétaires fonciers à prendre des décisions de récolte lorsque les revenus tirés de la séquestration du carbone sont pris en compte. Les intervalles de rotation et l’offre de crédit de carbone augmentent légèrement. Les essences à croissance rapide exigeant de courts intervalles de rotation ont des courbes d’offre de crédit de carbone relativement plus inélastiques que les essences à croissance lente exigeant de longs intervalles de rotation. Compte tenu des prix modérés du carbone, la plupart des gains tirés de la séquestration du carbone proviennent de la marge extensive associée à l’expansion des terres forestières, bien que près de 22 à 35 p. 100 de la quantité totale de carbone séquestré proviennent de la marge intensive associée à une augmentation des intervalles de rotation. La participation à la séquestration du carbone à partir de la marge intensive devient plus importante à mesure que le prix du carbone augmente.