An Exploratory Examination of Serious Surfers: Implications for the Surf Tourism Industry

Surf tourism is a multibillion dollar industry expected to continue expanding. Despite such economic significance, the surf tourism literature has gaps related to surf tourism segments. In response, this study applied the serious leisure framework to profile serious surfers and contrast their sociodemographic composition and travel behaviors. Although more serious surfers are more avid travelers in the quest for the perfect wave as compared with less serious surfers, preference for local attractions and conveniences did not vary between groups. In addition to contributing the scholarship of serious leisure and surf tourism, this study provides insights for the surf tourism industry. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EXPLICIT SOLUTIONS OF CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT PROBLEMS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS WITH REGIME SWITCHING

We consider a consumption and investment problem where the market presents different regimes. An investor taking decisions continuously in time selects a consumption–investment policy to maximize his expected total discounted utility of consumption. The market coefficients and the investor's utility of consumption are dependent on the regime of the financial market, which is modeled by an observable finite-state continuous-time Markov chain. We obtain explicit optimal consumption and investment policies for specific HARA utility functions. We show that the optimal policy depends on the regime. We also make an economic analysis of the solutions, and show that for every investor the optimal proportion to allocate in the risky asset is greater in a "bull market" than in a "bear market." This behavior is not affected by the investor's risk preferences. On the other hand, the optimal consumption to wealth ratio depends not only on the regime, but also on the investor's risk tolerance: high risk-averse investors will consume relatively more in a "bull market" than in a "bear market," and the opposite is true for low risk-averse investors.     

Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market

Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market.Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid (respectively, flexible) firms from this market. Meaningful comparative static results are derived.     

POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN PUERTO RICO, 1969–89: TRENDS AND SOURCES

The paper examines Puerto Rican trends in income distribution during the 1970s and 1980s, then attempts to ascertain the source of the changes in income inequality through a decomposition of the Gini coefficient by factor income source. The study finds that poverty and inequality declined unambiguously during the twenty-year period. The source of the fall in income concentration was found to have been tied, not to changes in the distribution or share of earned income, but to that of unearned income, particularly transfers. These appear to have also accounted for the decline in poverty.     

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 11–130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322–336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent's payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides.     

A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buyers state their true indifferences, the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78.     

On income fluctuations and capital gains

We consider the infinite time horizon problem of asymptotically maximizing the expected accumulated discounted utility in a one-good production economy. The available capital in a given period is given by the production of the previous period plus a random variable. The product of the discount and interest factors is either (1) greater than or (2) equal to one. Under (1) the optimal policy exists under certain conditions and always under (2). The optimal capital sequence almost surely goes to infinity. Under (1) with conditions on the utility one almost surely reaches a capital level above which the sequence is increasing.     

Lease Pricing for Farm Real Estate

A lease pricing model for farm land is developed that is consistent with traditional leasing principles and allows greater flexibility in determining crop share levels either separately or in combination with a fixed cash payment. The share levels are linked to the farm's soil productivity, the costs of each party's resource contributions, and their respective cost structures. The resulting menu of lease prices can enhance the equitability of leasing contracts, expand the range of contract choices, promote mutual incentives for the leasing parties, and heighten the efficiency of leasing markets through greater standardization of leases.