Equilibrium-correction vs. differencing in macroeconometric forecasting

Recent work by Clements and Hendry elucidate why forecasting systems that are in terms of differences, dVARs, can be more accurate than econometric models that include levels variables, EqCMs. For example, dVAR forecasts are in some cases insulated from parameter non-constancies in the long run mean of the cointegration relationships. In this paper, the practical relevance of these issues are investigated for RIMINI, the quarterly macroeconometric model used in Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), an example of an EqCM forecasting model. We develop two dVAR versions of the full RIMINI model and compare EqCM and dVAR forecasts for the period 1992.1–1994.4. We also include forecasts from univariate dVAR type models. The results seem to confirm the relevance of the theoretical results. First, dVAR forecasts appear to provide some immunity against parameter non-constancies that could seriously bias the EqCM forecasts. Second, the misspecification resulting from omitting levels information generates substantial biases in the dVAR forecasts 8 and 12 quarters ahead.     

Time is not money

In an ultimatum bargaining experiment, we study how subjects bargain over the returns to their investments of money and time. The most notable finding is that a third of the subjects demand no compensation for their time investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation for equally costly monetary investments.     

“One of these days,things are going to change!” How do you make sense of market disruption?

The significance of mindsets is apparent in everyday business life. As today’s managers and companies face uncertainty and disruptive change in the business environment and markets, there is a growing need to understand and strategically address such change. This becomes challenging when disruptive market forces confront the institutional logic or rules of the game based on collectively acquired experience of doing business in the given field. In overcoming such challenges, managers’ hidden reasoning remains an untapped potential while their existing mindset influences what they attend to and what they decide to do. This article elaborates a diagnostic framework, accompanied by a tool to help managers make sense of disruptive markets and reflect individually and collectively on possible courses of action. The framework has two principal dimensions—strategic scope and focus—that are further divided into three business elements of strategic market-oriented management: offering, customer, and market. The tool offers a practical means of profiling individuals’ mindsets. In increasingly dynamic business environments, reflection capabilities represent a new source of competitive advantage.     

Shaken or Stirred? Financial Deregulation and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Norway

Is there a credit channel for monetary policy? Has the deregulation of financial markets had any temporary or permanent effects on the monetary transmission mechanism? We present empirical evidence on these issues for Norway by estimating a dynamic system of money, credit, real income and inflation. We find that the deregulation process has not caused any permanent shifts in the long‐run demand functions. Within a small simultaneous dynamic model, there is some evidence for the credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism, as both credit and money exhibit strong and stable effects on aggregate demand. JEL classification: E50; E44; C51     

Initiation of business relationships in service-dominant settings

Industrial companies today are becoming increasingly service-oriented and therefore need to shift from selling hardware to valuing services and managing customer relationships. A new and particularly significant challenge for these companies is how to initiate relationships which is an issue that has received surprisingly limited scientific attention. The aim of this study is to develop a conceptualization that explores the dynamics in the relationship initiation process in service-dominant settings. Narratives from three sellers of professional services, augmented with narratives from a buyer's view, form the empirical basis of the study. The dynamics in the relationship initiation process are clarified with three new concepts: status, converter, and inhibitor. The paper concludes with implications of the new conceptualization and suggestions for future research.     

Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly

I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank may actually be to stay out.     

EDUCATED MANPOWER BEHIND NORWAY'S EXPORTS,DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION,AND INVESTMENT*

This paper contains some of the main results of an investigation into the use of educated manpower in Norwegian industries. An input-output model with labour inputs specified by education is presented. Per unit of final delivery, Norwegian exports in 1960 used relatively less labour, and less educated labour, but more capital (measured by depreciation) than the other categories of final demand. But when the use of labour is compared to the income created by the final deliveries, the differences are much smaller.     

The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation of an inside option that small stores do not have. We find that big stores will not be formed when the stores' ex ante bargaining power vis‐à‐vis producers is high. Otherwise, an asymmetric situation occurs with only one big store created when one‐stop shoppers are abundant.     

Adverse selection, public information, and underpricing in IPOs

This paper generalizes the informational environment of the Rock model to address empirical evidence and conjectures that cannot be addressed within the standard model based on informed and uninformed investors such as underpricing being positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO, the number of IPOs being positively related to market returns, underpricing being partly predictable based on public information, and the return to uninformed participation being negative overall but positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO. Finally, the model suggests that a positive relation between market returns and underpricing need not represent an inefficiency in the pricing of IPOs.