Trademark infringement and optimal monitoring policy

The paper addresses a trademark infringer who seeks to capitalize on the reputation of a trademark owner, sells an identical product under a trademark which is confusingly similar to that of the owner, charges the same price and competes with him in the same market. We show that the welfare-maximizing monitoring intensity is zero, hence the government is not likely to engage in monitoring infringement. Recognizing this, the trademark owner may consider monitoring the market himself, discovering, however, that this is worth his while only if the penalty for infringement, which he fully collects, is sufficiently high. Given the entry condition, an increase in the penalty may either raise or lower the optimal monitoring intensity. In the former case it will counter-intuitively increase the infringer's expected profit, apparently because a higher penalty will also lead to a raise in price. While monitoring enables the trademark owner to maintain a positive profit level, it reduces social welfare. The government may intervene to eliminate the private incentive for monitoring through taxing the collected penalty.     

Risk Management for E-Cash Systems with Partial Real-Time Audit

We analyze coin-wallet and balance-wallet under partial real-time audit, and compute upper bounds on theft due to the fact that not all the transactions are audited in real time, assuming that everything else is perfect. In particular, we assume that the audit regime holds for innocent payees. Let v be the maximum allowed balance in a wallet, and 01 be the fraction of transactions that are audited in real time in an audit round. Assume one unit transactions. We show that the upper bound on expected theft for coin-wallet is lim₀^–2, while for plausible (similar) parameter choice the bound for a balance-wallet is O(exp(mv)), where 1<m. The former is nicely bounded for small transactions, however, the bound for balance-wallet can become huge in those cases where we require very small false alarm probability. We conclude that partial audit, may be suitable for coin-wallets with low denomination coins, and possibly for balance-wallet, when we may tolerate a relatively high false alarm rate, but it may be too risky for balance-wallet, where very low false alarm rate is required.     

The Geopolitics of Neighbourhood: Jerusalem’s Colonial Space Revisited

This article will focus on an ongoing process of Jerusalem’s contested urban space during the last decade namely the immigration of Palestinians, mostly Israeli citizens, to “satellite neighbourhoods”, i.e. Jerusalem’s colonial neighbourhoods that were constructed after 1967. Theoretically, this paper attempts to discuss neighbourhood planning in contested cities within the framework of geopolitics. In more details, we will focus on the relevance of geopolitics to the study of neighbourhood planning, by which we mean not merely a discussion of international relations and conflict or of the roles of military acts and wars in producing space. Rather, geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces connected with the technologies of control, patterns of internal migrations by individuals and communities, and the flow of cultures and capital.