Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

Labour productivity and rice production in Bangladesh: a stochastic frontier approach

During the NCAA basketball tournaments from 2002 to 2005, men's games produced 27% more upsets than women's games. To test whether these unpredictable results were due to gender differences, we conduct logit analysis to explain upsets by gender and other potentially significant variables, including differences in competing teams’: (i) RPI scores, (ii) percentage of freshmen, (iii) percentage of seniors, (iv) top scorer's total points and, (v) top three scorers’ total points. These analyses suggest that gender plays a significant role in explaining predictability.     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

Group Dynamics of Corruption in Public Organizations

Abstract

When there are two groups of officials in a public organization, we show that depending on the groups’ behavior – collusive or competitive – increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both the level of corrupt activities and the corrupt officials’ bribe revenues. However, if the groups had not been colluding, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the optimum level of monitoring, is this result reversed.     

Is Talk Cheap?

For the steel import quota bill of 1999, each word in the Congressional Record costs $39 in campaign contributions from the steel industry. Consequently, our answer is "Yes, talk is cheap!"     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

Trade liberalization and capacity utilization: New evidence from the Turkish rubber industry

This study empirically tests the hypothesis that trade liberalization increases capacity utilization. It calculates capacity utilization for the Turkish rubber industry by using a production theory framework. More specifically, plant-level capacity utilization levels are calculated using a Generalized Leontief cost function system. Capacity utilization levels were low but improved when the trade regime shifted from a restrictive to a more liberalized one. The size and location of plants were two significant factors which created capacity utilization differences within the industry. However, capacity utilization levels appeared to improve primarily because of trade liberalization.Also, a scholar-in-residence, Department of Economics, Duke University. My particular thanks go to Patrick Conway, Marjorie McElroy, Edward Tower, participants of the International Economics Workshops at Duke University, and the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Any errors are mine.     

Does Trade Liberalization Benefit Young and Old Alike?

In an overlapping generations model, capital and labor produce two tradable goods. A kleptocratic government spends the tariff revenue. Trade liberalization benefits the retired generation if and only if the relative price of the capital-intensive good rises. Starting from autarky, a small liberalization benefits subsequent generations if and only if it hurts the retired one, a result reminiscent of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, the terms-of-trade effect means a large liberalization may simultaneously raise the welfare of all generations.     

The Cotton Influence Index: An Examination of U.S. Cotton Subsidies

Given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton, we introduce a Cotton Influence Index to capture legislators' influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. Regression analyses reveal a relationship between Cotton Influence Index and campaign contributions, cotton farmland, party affiliation, and ideology. Tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different "actions and participations" by representatives to advance the interest of cotton—that is, components of this index and their future cotton political action committees' (PACs) contributions to them.