AGRICULTURE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND: AMBITIONS AND REALITIES

Agricultural trade policies are basically a function of domestic policy considerations which have produced high levels of support in many countries. New policy instruments such as direct payments, which are more demanding in terms of information costs but which distort resource allocation less, are becoming more attractive. Unilateral liberalisation is, however, unlikely. Freer trade is a public good which requires international collective action to be provided. Countries which have a clear-cut trade interest in liberalising markets for commodities they export can play the role of catalyst in international co-ordination. The existence of big players is a favourable factor. Hence, the drift of the Round towards a co-ordination of US-EC interests. Both political economy and trade interest considerations suggest that an agreement reached will have its main impact on crops which are widely traded. The main constraining factor of an agreement on EC and US agriculture will be the discipline it will impose on the use of export subsidies. Agriculture will still not come fully under GATT rules which apply to other sectors, but in the future the CAP will be more constrained by international commitments than in the past.     

TECHNICAL CHANGE AND EC-US AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALISATION

The paper aims to investigate the biases produced by assessing the effects of partial liberalisation of EC and US farm policies through comparative-static simulations, when a more adequate approach would require time, or more precisely technical change, to be explicitly accounted for. Three points are underlined: taking into account technical change (i) alters the trade-off between farm income and budgetary expenditures, (ii) has different effects according to the policy instruments used, and (iii) may reverse the sign of cross-effects, particularly on the budget, in the case of large price-support reductions which result in trade reversal. The relatively limited fall in farm income losses in scenarios corresponding to full harmonisation makes the associated support-price cuts more acceptable, both politically and socially.     

The Tariff-Only Import Regime for Bananas in the European Union: Impacts on ACP and Non-ACP Suppliers

The European Union is bound by World Trade Organisation agreements to move to a tariff-only import regime for bananas no later than 1 January 2006. What should change at that date is the trade regime, not the level of protection offered to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This article provides an assessment of the trade impact of this tariff-only regime on the basis of simulations carried out with a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the world banana market using 2002–03 as the base year. Simulation results show that the tariff levied on imports from non-ACP countries should be set at around €250 per tonne in order to maintain in 2008 the EU import structure that prevailed in 2003. A lower tariff would increase EU total imports, to the benefit of non-ACP countries and to the detriment of the group of ACP countries. Conversely, a higher tariff would decrease EU imports from non-ACP countries and increase imports from ACP suppliers. Under this assumption, the increase in ACP exports to the EU would mainly benefit the two West African suppliers, Cameroon and Ivory Coast, who are more competitive and have a more price elastic supply than the ACP suppliers of the Caribbean islands.     

Measuring Market Power for Food Retail Activities: French Evidence

In this paper we develop and estimate an empirical model of pricing behaviour for food retail firms in both a quantity‐setting oligopoly engaged in the joint production of demand‐related final goods and a quantity‐setting oligopsony for supply‐unrelated wholesale goods. The procedure consists of estimating an inverse demand system for the final goods, single supply functions for the wholesale goods and the retail industry first‐order profit‐maximisation conditions, from which an estimate of the degree of imperfect competition and of oligopoly‐oligopsony power for the different commodities can be retrieved. The model is applied to the French food retail industry and three commodities are distinguished: dairy products, meat products and other food products. We strongly reject the hypothesis that French food retail firms behave competitively, and more than 20 and 17 per cent of the wholesale‐to‐retail price margins for dairy products and meat products, respectively, can be attributed to oligopoly‐oligopsony distortions.     

An economic assessment of the Common Market Organization for bananas in the European Union

The main objective of this paper is to provide some estimates of how the world banana market has been affected by the Common Market Organization (CMO) for bananas established in the European Union (EU) on 1 July 1993, and modified in April 1994. We quantify the effects of the new EU regulation on world and EU prices, on the structure of EU imports from Latin American countries, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and EU regional suppliers, on the pattern of consumption in the various EU member states, and on consumers' and producers' welfare using a static partial equilibrium model of the world banana market. Simulation results suggest that the two key variables in determining the effects of the CMO are the size of the tariff quota on dollar and non-traditional ACP bananas and the capacity of ACP countries to exhaust their ACP contingent share.     

The Future of European Union Dairy Policy

Even if the quota regime has been extended until 2007–08 as part of the Agenda 2000 reform adopted in March 1999, the European Union (EU) dairy sector is currently experiencing large uncertainty over future policy. This paper examines EU dairy policy issues and assesses their likely implications. It mainly addresses the central question of dismantling the quota and intervention support mechanisms. Simulation results illustrate how three factors (marginal costs of production, import tariffs on dairy products and compensatory payments granted to dairy producers) may affect the outcomes of a quota elimination scenario.
Même si le régime des quotas a été prolongé jusqu'en 2007–2008 à l'occasion de la réforme Agenda 2000 de mars 1999, le débat sur la nécessité d'une réforme plus importante de la politique laitiére européenne n'est pas clos. Dans ce papier, nous analysons les différentes contraintes auxquelles l'Union européenne doit faire face et ses implications pour le secteur laitier communautaire. L'attention est centrée sur les conséquences d'une suppression du régime des quotas et du mécanisme de l'intervention. Les résultats de simulation montrent comment les conséquences d'un tel scénario dépendent de trois facteurs, i.e., les coûts marginaux de production du lait, la protection tarifaire sur les importations européennes de produits laitiers et les mesures de compensation accordées aux producteurs de lait.     

Derivation of Long-run Factor Demands from Short-run Responses

The concept of the restricted cost function provides a dual approach to the analysis of short-run technology. It allows also, under curvature restrictions, inference of the different possible equilibria, according to constraints on the firms. Moreover, in this paper, the properties of the restricted cost function are spelled out. Substitution possibilities related to the different regimes are also derived from the restricted cost function. This theoretical framework is applied to characterize the French cereal-producing sector by using a cross-section of farms.     

Taxes and Subsidies in Vertically Related Markets

In the framework of a two–country, two–good partial equilibrium model where one of the commodities (the bulk commodity) is an intermediate input in the production of the second good (the processed good), we assume that the government wishes to transfer income to both bulk commodity and processed good producers. Our analysis is concerned with efficient redistribution. The instruments are subsidies or taxes, and there is an opportunity cost of public funds. We use the targeting principle to characterize the set of optimal subsidies or taxes applied on both the bulk commodity and the final good in this vertically related market structure. The theoretical analysis is illustrated using the example of cereals (the bulk commodity) and pork and poultry (the processed good) in the European Union.