Exports to Smuggle and Smuggling Technologies*

Our analysis is motivated by cases of cigarette smuggling in Canada and in the UK. In the 1990s, domestic cigarettes were legally exported to be subsequently illegally imported. At first, smuggling was done by individual consumers who bought cigarettes abroad and brought them back through policed points of entry. This Mom and Pop smuggling was a mechanism to implement a second‐degree price discrimination scheme by cigarette manufacturers. Regrets from committing tax evasion and labels on exported cigarettes packs permit vertical differentiation of illegal and legal cigarettes. Paradoxically, labeling measures can make illegal sales more resilient to tax reductions, and stricter border enforcement encourages a switch to a less benign smuggling technology exclusive to criminal organizations. High export taxes terminated export‐to‐smuggle schemes, but brought about a surge of counterfeit cigarettes. Because of a second‐degree price discrimination scheme, the elimination of taxes need not suffice to eradicate smuggling.     

On the Number and Heterogeneity of Bidders in Livestock Auctions

We show in the context of livestock auctions that a seller's revenue may increase or decrease as the number of buyers increases, whether the additional bidder wins or not an object. Additional bidders who fill part of their demand from an outside source may have an even more adverse effect on prices. We use data from the Quebec daily hog auction to measure the effect of new bidders on auction prices. Variations in the number of bidders come from the entry and exit of Quebec packers and sporadic invitations extended to Ontario packers. We find that entry by Quebec packers had a significant positive impact on hog auction prices but that sporadic participation by Ontario packers did not have a significant impact on hog prices.     

Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality

Recent food scares such as the discoveries of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and E. coli -contaminated spinach have heightened interest in food traceability. Here, we show how exogenous increases in food traceability create incentives for farms and marketing firms to supply safer food by increasing liability costs. We model a stylized marketing chain composed of farms, marketers, and consumers. Unsafe food for consumers can be caused by either marketers or farms. We show that food safety declines with the number of farms and marketers and imperfect traceability from consumers to marketers dampens liability incentives to supply safer food by farms.     

Price equivalent tariffs and quotas under a domestic monopoly

Price-equivalent import tariffs and quotas are compared when domestic production is controlled by a monopolist, say an agricultural marketing board with the power to restrict domestic supply, under endogenous terms of trade. Welfare comparisons boil down to sourcing costs comparisons. Quotas tend to dominate at high domestic prices, ad valorem tariffs at intermediate prices and specific tariffs at low domestic prices. Welfare maxima are achieved with more restrictive policies than under perfect competition. These results rationalize separate negotiations for sensitive products in the Doha Round and the setting of tariff-rate quotas that mimic import quotas for these products. Finally, in ascertaining the robustness of our policy ranking to the choice of variable anchoring the comparisons, we found that specific tariffs unambiguously dominate ad valorem tariffs and quotas when government revenue or imports anchor the comparisons. However, some quota revenues and import levels cannot be achieved with tariffs.     

Import sensitive products and perverse tariff‐rate quota liberalization

Abstract This paper shows that a Tariff‐Rate‐Quota's (TRQ) minimum access expansion can perversely trigger domestic price increases. Often, TRQs have prohibitive over‐quota tariffs to mimic import quotas in providing minimum market access. In the WTO's Doha Round, it is likely that countries using TRQs will avoid aggressive tariff reductions if they increase the quota portion of TRQs. We show that when the import price lies between the unit cost of production and the price received by domestic upstream firms, an increase in import quota as a share of domestic production may cause an increase in the domestic retail price.     

Detecting the presence of insider trading via structural break tests

The occurrence of abnormal returns before the unscheduled announcement of price sensitive information is a potential indicator of insider trading. We identify insider trading with a structural change in the intercept of an extended capital asset pricing model. To detect such a change we introduce a consistent timing structural break test (CTSB) based upon a U-statistic type process. Unlike the traditional CUSUM test, the CTSB test provides a consistent estimator of the timing of a break in the intercept that occurs across the whole evaluation period. We apply our test to a rich data set covering 370 price sensitive announcements relating to FTSE 350 companies. Our test is able to detect potential insider trading far more reliably than the standard CUSUM test. We also show that the majority of suspected insider trading takes place in the 25 days prior to the release of market sensitive information.