The Impact of Political Competition on Economic Growth: Evidence from Municipalities in South Africa

This paper examines the impact of political competition on economic growth. In this paper, I show that internal political dynamics, distinct from the type of political system, can having different effects on growth. Using results from the 1994 and 1999 elections in South Africa, I show that municipalities with higher levels of political competition have shown lower levels of economic growth. I use individual level surveys to show that this political competition is associated with political paralysis, dissatisfaction with the current democracy and government and lower optimism about the future.     

An Examination of Subnational Growth in Nigeria: 1999‐2012

I use satellite imagery on night‐time lights to measure growth across states and local government areas in Nigeria since the return of democracy in 1999. The data suggest that states in southern Nigeria have grown faster on average than states in the north. Using the Ordinary Least Squares, I estimate a relationship between change in night lights and real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Africa and use the coefficients to estimate GDP growth for states and local government areas in Nigeria over the period. Finally, I evaluate the effects of violence on growth in Plateau, Yobe and Borno states. I find that the crisis in Plateau state has resulted in slower growth compared with other states in the region. I also show that Yobe and Borno states had performed worse than other states in the north even before the outbreak of violence related to the Boko Haram sect.     

The trans‐Atlantic slave trade and local political fragmentation in Africa

This article examines the possibility that the trans‐Atlantic slave trade influenced the political institutions of villages and towns in precolonial Africa. Using anthropological data, it shows that villages and towns of ethnic groups with higher slave exports were more politically fragmented during the precolonial era. Instrumental variables are used to show that the relationship is causal. It is argued that this fragmentation is important for relative economic development because it still influences political institutions today. This argument is supported by the use of more contemporary data to show that in contemporary Nigeria and Tanzania, areas with higher levels of precolonial political fragmentation have a higher incidence of bribery.