R&D Investments and Tax Incentives: The Role of Intra-Firm Cross-Border Collaboration*

U.S. multinational corporations increasingly use intra-firm, cross-border research collaboration to disperse R&D across different countries. This paper investigates the implications of such collaboration on the abilities of firms to garner benefits from R&D tax incentives. We find that the association between R&D intensity and tax incentives is three to five times larger when firms have extensive cross-border collaboration connected to a country. We also find that the effect is stronger when local intellectual property protection is weaker and when local innovation resources are higher. Our results suggest that cross-border collaboration helps firms achieve more tax-efficient R&D investments both by reducing the nontax frictions posed by weak intellectual property protection and by increasing the nontax benefits of foreign R&D.     

Measuring rural consumers’ willingness to pay for quality labels using experimental auctions: the case of aflatoxin‐free maize in Kenya

Aflatoxins are a common health hazard in tropical countries, especially in rural areas. New methods to reduce aflatoxin levels in food staples, as well as cheaper test methods, are being developed, but consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for these improvements is unknown. A survey was conducted with a representative sample of rural consumers (1,344 in total, 63% women) in all major maize‐production zones of Kenya. The survey included an experimental auction with maize products of different qualities. The results showed that many rural consumers were aware of aflatoxins, but few understood their health risks. Respondents were willing to pay a premium for maize tested for aflatoxins and labeled, but asked a high discount for maize that was visibly contaminated with moldy grain. The premium was higher for respondents with education and in regions with aflatoxicosis outbreaks. Knowledge of aflatoxins substantially reduced the overall WTP, but did not increase the WTP for tested maize. Welfare analysis indicates that mandatory testing would result in substantial benefits if the cost of testing can be lowered to below the premium.     

Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.     

Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments

In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model.We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones—regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold.     

Auctions with toeholds: An experimental study of company takeovers

We run experiments on English Auctions where the bidders already own a part (toehold) of the good for sale. The theory predicts a very strong (“explosive”) effect of even small toeholds. While asymmetric toeholds do have an effect on bids and revenues in the lab, which gets stronger the larger the asymmetry, it is not nearly as strong as predicted. We explain this by analyzing the flatness of the payoff functions, which leads to large deviations from the equilibrium strategies being relatively costless. This is a general fundamental weakness of this type of explosive equilibria, which makes them fail when human players are involved. Our analysis shows that a levels of reasoning model explains the results better where this equilibrium fails. Moreover, we find that although big toeholds can be effective in a takeover battle, the cost to acquire them might be higher than the strategic benefit they bring.     

Resources as dual sources of advantage: Implications for valuing entrepreneurial‐firm patents

Why and how do resources provide sources of competitive advantage? This study sheds new light on this central question of resource‐based theory by allowing a single resource—entrepreneurial‐firm patents—to play distinctive roles in different competitive arenas. As rights to exclude others, patents serve a well‐known role as legal safeguards in product markets. As quality signals, patents also could improve access and the terms of trade in factor input markets. Based on the financing activities of 370 venture‐backed semiconductor start‐ups, we provide new evidence that patents confer dual advantages in strategic factor markets, improved access and terms of trade, above and beyond their added product‐market protection. The study has important implications for empirical tests of resource‐based theory and the measurement of resource value. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of information in different bargaining protocols

We analyze a bargaining protocol recently proposed in the literature vis-à-vis unconstrained negotiation. This new mechanism extracts “gains from trade” inherent in the differing valuation of two parties towards various issues where conflict exists. We assess the role of incomplete vs. complete information in the efficiency achieved by this new mechanism and by unconstrained negotiation. We find that unconstrained negotiation does best under a situation of complete information where the valuations of both bargaining parties are common knowledge. Instead, the newly proposed mechanism does best in a situation with incomplete information. The sources of inefficiencies in each of the two cases arise from the different strategic use of the available information.