Squatting as a transition problem in South Africa

This paper applies principles of transition to land tenure and squatting in South Africa. Political transition in South Africa reassigned political property rights, which produced contestable, and rent‐seeking incentives for squatting as a means to privatize land and redistribute wealth. Government failure to establish and protect private property rights in a squatter camp resulted in common‐pool problems that resisted private and public resolution with consequent rent dissipation and social loss. In response to this retreat from duty, informal agents emerged to claim their own share of the prize. Without enforceable rules of capture, the growth of squatter camps in South Africa will continue. JEL classification: D7, H8, K1, K4, R1, R4.     

A duration analysis of privatization in the telecom sector

The paper attempts to identify the telecom-sector performance indicators, relevant economic variables, and institutional characteristics of a country that effect the process of privatization of state-owned telecom enterprises. Using standard duration analysis of a panel data, we demonstrate that the privatization incentives are not only shaped by the mobility of financial capital in a country but are also influenced by the degree of competitiveness of private sector participation in policy-making process. The empirical results also reveal the significant impact of productive efficiency in telecom service provision on its course to privatization. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We are solely responsible for all mistakes.     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

Lessons from the transition process

The illusions that market mechanism would transform former communist countries easily into welfare states were gradually replaced by disappointments. Major problems are common to all countries in transition; they all endured an unprecedented fall in measured output and rise of unemployment. Four countries: former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia constitute a group in which the fall was the lowest and which also have reached the bottom. While the mechanisms of depression in these countries differ basic links of the vicious circle seem to be similar. The transition is reflected in constitutional provisions on property rights; new constitutions depart radically from their socialist predecessors, return to the principles of French revolution, and provide more than adequate protection of private property. Equally important are legal frameworks for market activities, and privatization aimed to improve efficiency, enable fairness, and serve in the abolition of the monoparty system.     

Is R&D spending influenced by disinvestment and local political corruption? The case of Indian central public sector enterprises

The current study examines the effect of disinvestment (dilution of state ownership) and local political corruption on R&D spending in enterprises owned by the central government of India. Based on certain characteristic features of innovation as a strategy available to state-owned enterprises, I build two sets of hypotheses formalising the channels of how these variables may affect the possibility and amount of R&D. Data is drawn from multiple sources to compile a dataset that covers all manufacturing central government-owned enterprises in India over a period of ten years from 2007 to 2016. The study employs an instrumental variable technique to reduce the endogeneity between disinvestment and R&D decisions. We find that, while disinvestment and local political corruption have strong negative effects on whether a firm invests in R&D or not, it has no effect on the amount of R&D. In fact, the amount is driven by a host of firm-specific factors such as size, profit and proficiency of the share of skilled labor, managerial strength and non-unionisation of labor. We also find that the effects are strongly driven by the size of firms, special status awarded to firms and the ideology of the state where the enterprise operates.     

The impact of privatization on efficiency and profitability

Over the past three decades, China has undergone tremendous economic and social change as a consequence of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. This paper examines a key feature of this transition – the privatization of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) – through both a theoretical model and empirical analysis. Using newly collected primary data from a variety of sources, we study how privatization of listed SOEs affects employment, wages, profits and other aspects of economic performance at the firm level. Our major finding is that privatization results in substantial downsizing of employment, increased labour productivity and rising profitability.     

Government Stakes as an Insurance Policy: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings of Chinese Firms

While privatization has attracted much more attention in the literature, one type of reverse privatization, a privately-controlled firm inviting government ownership as its minority shareholders, is neglected in the literature. Using large-scale census firm data from China, we investigate the determinants of this kind of reverse privatization and its impact on firm performance. We find that (1) the decision of reverse privatization by Chinese private firms is affected by local political risk, firm-level financial characteristics, and industry-level characteristics, (2) the reverse privatization significantly affects the firm’s performance, which is measured in different proxies but the effects are not consistent, and (3) moreover, we find that the benefit of reverse privatization decreases as government ownership increases. Our results suggest that the prevalence of reverse privatization in China is a political outcome, which is affected by the trade-off of political risk and political privilege. Our work suggests that political risk and political considerations are the main driving factors of privatization, or its opposite, reverse privatization. Reverse privatization, to some extent, is a rational choice in some transition economies. Our findings offer clear policy implications to the nationalization phenomenon taking place around the world recently.     

HOLDINGS OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN COMPANIES IN FINLAND: PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN THE LONGER TERM

Applying an approach of neo‐institutional research, this article examines the history of company holdings of the national government and local governments in Finland in the longer term. The article examines the genealogy of the institutional forms of these holdings, the diffusion, adoption and adaptation of these forms, and the political legitimacy of new forms and the political de‐legitimation of earlier forms. For theory, the results indicate that the individual tailoring of institutional forms offers flexibility but increases complexity. For practice, the results suggest that the company form may too easily marginalize alternative institutional forms such as co‐operatives, associations, and foundations.