Consumer responses to trade-offs in eco-friendly clothing: The moderating effects of fashion leadership and regulatory focus

Consumers of eco-friendly clothing often face trade-offs between eco-friendliness and other product attributes. Across two experiments, we investigate the moderating role of fashion leadership and regulatory focus in such trade-off situations. Our results suggest that while non-fashion leaders are willing to trade-off hedonic attributes for eco-friendliness, fashion leaders are not willing to trade-off either hedonic or utilitarian attributes. It is also suggested that prevention-focused fashion leaders are more likely than promotion-focused fashion leaders to trade-off hedonic attributes for eco-friendliness. Implications for practitioners as well as directions for future research are discussed.     

Labour use efficiency in the Indian and Pakistani commercial banks

The Indian and Pakistani banking industry is said to have an excessive use of labour due to the significant market share of government owned banks. Both countries have undertaken a process of regulatory reform to bring about market discipline in the usage of inputs and to increase the labour use efficiency and productivity. The focus of this paper is the estimation of productivity and efficiency of labour use in the banking sectors of the Indian sub-continent. The results show that the efficiency of labour use across the Indian sub-continent is improving over time and that foreign banks are more efficient compared to domestically owned banks in their usage of labour.     

Media attention and regulatory efficiency of corporate violations: Evidence from China

We examine the influence of media attention on the regulatory efficiency of corporate violations in a restrictive media environment. Using a hand-collected sample of corporate violations in China during 1998–2018, we find that fraudulent firms accompanied by more negative media attention are associated with a higher hazard rate of the violation being investigated and enforced. The effect is not diminished by the political connections of the fraudulent firms and is robust after controlling for potential confounding factors. Our findings suggest that by influencing regulatory efficiency, the media serve as an effective governance mechanism even in markets with strict media control.     

Deregulation,news releases,and price discovery

We hypothesize that the firm’s regulatory environment influences the sensitivity of its equity value to information. Using intraday stock price data of utilities operating in differing regulatory environments we test for systematic differences between the responsiveness of stock prices of utility firms operating in deregulated and regulated environments to a common information set. Our findings reveal sharp differences in responses, with those of utilities operating in deregulated environments the strongest, and the responses of utilities in highly regulated environments the weakest. While the evidence supports our hypothesis, in a broader sense, the evidence suggests that deregulation aids in the process of price discovery. We also find evidence that suggests that deregulation, per se, does not lead to higher stock price volatility.      

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

对控制性详细规划编制若干问题的探讨——以某市滨水地段控规为例

在中国现行的城市规划体系框架中,各层次规划的主要作用都是为了控制和引导城市合理、有序地发展.在城市规划领域里,可以分配的最重要的社会资源是城市土地的开发权以及在城市土地使用关系上建立起来的各种城市空间关系,这使得控制性详细规划成为实施规划管理的核心内容和直接依据.文章对控制性详细规划编制中的"现状调查"、"区域分析"、"指标确定"以及控规中的城市设计等问题进行了一定的探讨,并引入实例,以期对当前控制性详细规划体制的进一步完善起到一定的促进作用.     

The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择

本探讨了银行监管的微观基础，认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下，银行业具有内在的不稳定性，需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营，但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响，在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。     

Politically connected boards,value or cost: evidence from a natural experiment in China

This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.     

供应商集中、公司治理与企业价值 ——基于我国A股制造业上市公司数据

本文通过选取2010—2017年我国A股制造业上市公司的数据,先研究公司供应商集中对于公司价值的直接影响,结论显示公司供应商集中对于企业价值有着负面的影响;然后在进一步研究中,探究了公司治理相关因素以及面临的融资约束情况对于公司供应商集中与公司价值关系的调节作用。实证结果显示,产权性质以及董事会独立性会对两者的关系产生影响;股东间的相互关联以及对于高管薪酬激励都对公司供应商集中与公司价值的关系有着负向的调节作用。与此同时公司面临的融资约束越小,公司供应商集中对于公司价值的负面效应越弱;最后利用多重中介效应模型探究了供应商集中的作用机制。