Domestic financial market frictions,unrestricted international capital flows,and crises in small open economies

Summary. We present an example of a small open economy where small increases in the world interest rate may induce a sharp decline in output and a precipitous depreciation of the exchange rate. Due to a costly state verification problem in domestic credit markets, combined with unrestricted international capital flows, our economy generates two long-run equilibria, one with low GDP and a relatively depreciated real exchange rate (RER), and one with high GDP and a relatively appreciated RER. The first is always a saddle, while the second may be a sink or a source, depending on the level of the world interest rate. A crisis is identified with the economy switching from an equilibrium path approaching the high-output steady state to the saddlepath approaching the low-output steady state. In Mexicos recent history, periods of growth associated with appreciation of the RER have alternated with periods of sharp contraction and depreciation of the RER. Our economy displays such behavior in response to changes in the world interest rate.Received: 9 April 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E5, F4.G. Antinolfi, E. Huybens: We thank Steve Fazzari, Tim Kehoe, Todd Keister, Manuel Santos, Karl Shell and especially Bruce Smith for very helpful discussions. Jaime Calleja Alderete, Eduardo Camero Godínez, and Juan Vargas Hernández provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. Huybens was an assistant professor in the Centro de Investigación Económica, ITAM, at the time this article was written, and part of this work was completed while Antinolfi was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not reflect those of the World Bank or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Correspondence to: G. Antinolfi     

Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements

We characterize welfare maximizing capital requirement policies in a quantitative macrobanking model with household, firm, and bank defaults calibrated to Euro Area data. We optimize on the level of the capital requirements applied to each loan class and their sensitivity to changes in default risk. We find that getting the level right (so that bank failure risk remains contained) is of foremost importance, while the optimal sensitivity to default risk is positive but typically smaller than under Basel internal ratings based (IRB) formulas. Starting from low levels, savers and borrowers benefit from higher capital requirements. At higher levels, only savers prefer tighter requirements.     

Bubbles,banks and financial stability

The macroeconomic impact of rational bubbles in a limited commitment economy crucially depends on whether banks or ordinary savers hold the bubble. Banks hold the bubble asset when their leverage is high, when long-term real interest rates are low or when lax supervision allows them to enjoy high deposit insurance subsidies. When banks are the bubble-holders, this amplifies the output boom by reducing loan–deposit rate spreads while the bubble survives but also deepens the recession when the bubble bursts. In contrast, the real impact of bubbles held by ordinary savers is more muted.     

MODELLING A REGIME‐SHIFTING BEVERIDGE CURVE

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Preference shocks,international frictions,and international business cycles

Replicating the degree of cross-country comovements of macroeconomic aggregates, dynamics of prices and quantities of international trade, and the behavior of consumption and labor remains an important challenge in international business cycle literature. This paper incorporates preference shocks into a standard two-country model in which there exist international frictions, such as costs of transportation and restrictions to international asset trade. Country-specific preference shocks that generate fluctuations in each country's consumption and labor solve the puzzles, except for the discrepancy between theory and data regarding international trade variables. The presence or absence of international frictions plays a limited role in solving the puzzles.     

Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area

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Great Recession and Macroeconomic Theory: A Useless Crisis?

ABSTRACT

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DSGE forecasts of the lost recovery

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