论理性预期理论的合理性

作对理性预期理论进行了较全面的分析，指出这一假说理论上的合理性。有效市场理论及国外一些国家在治理通货膨胀方面的实践均是理性预期理论与实践较完善的结合。作把理性预期理论当作一种工具，尝度着用这一理论对我国经济现状进行了分析，同时给出了政策性的建设。     

高职院校大学生诚信状况调查及教育对策探析

诚信是中华民族的传统美德,是全人类所认同的道德规范。文章通过问卷调查的方式,对高职院校大学生诚信状况进行了调查,根据调查的结果,总结和分析了其中存在的主要问题及成因,提出了高职院校大学生诚信重建的对策。     

合同与诚实信用刍议

合同是市场经济条件下，交易双方所采用的法律形式。合同的缔结、履行应贯彻市场经济的基本要求，即诚实信用。诚实信用是市场主体在市场交易活动中应奉行的道德规范，同时又是必须遵守的法律准则。     

诚实信用原则在县级政府的适用

作为建立和维护基层社会信用体系的主要承担者的县级政府,其自身的信用是建立社会信用体系的关键.如何适用诚实信用原则是作为我国法律与政策的基层执行机关--县级政府自身的信用建设的重要方式也是构建和谐社会,创新行政管理方式的重要内容.     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.     

老赖越多,贷款越难?——来自地区诚信水平与上市公司银行借款的证据

本文首次利用最高人民法院发布的失信被执行人数据(俗称“老赖”)度量地区诚信水平,并以2003—2014年A股上市公司为样本实证检验地区诚信水平对上市公司银行借款比例的影响。研究发现,相比诚信水平较高的地区,上市公司在失信环境下能够获得更多的银行借款。机制检验的结果表明,上市公司信息透明度更高、受外部监督更多,能够缓解失信环境下企业违约风险的提高。进一步研究还发现,当银行作为原告方的诉讼中“老赖”比例越高时,失信环境对上市公司银行借款比例的作用更加显著;而当企业遭遇行业危机或企业所在城市信用体系建设相对完备时,地区诚信水平的影响会被削弱。该结论在经过一系列内生性和稳健性检验之后,依然成立。本文从银企借贷的视角解释了地区诚信水平对企业融资和发展的作用,也为企业获取信贷资源、缓解融资难问题提供了可行路径。     

浅谈房地产经纪人的行业自律与社会规范

随着改革逐渐深入,中国的房地产业蓬勃发展,为了顺应市场经济的需求,一个近年来新兴的行业悄然升起。房地产经纪人——作为新时代的朝阳产业。以其极高的收入,吸引着越来越多的人。然而。我国的房地产经纪人的管理现状。仍然处于混乱无序的状态。怎样实现房地产经纪人的行为自律和社会规范的和谐统一。是摆在社会工作者面前的一个艰巨的任务。     

Which reviewers are honest and caring? The effect of constructive and prosocial information on the perceived credibility of online reviews

Consumers often infer review credibility based on the content of online reviews. This study explores the influences of three positive review types on consumers’ perceptions of posters’ honesty and caring and subsequently review credibility. An experiment was conducted and the participants included 931 online travel community users. The results found that compared with positive reviews that contain only complimentary information, reviews that also contain constructive or prosocial information improve subjects’ perception of posters’ honesty and caring, respectively, and that this influence is particularly significant for participants with low propensity to trust. Second, compared with hotels with high reputation, consumers have significantly reduced perceptions of reviewers’ honesty if the reviewers provide only complimentary information in positive reviews for hotels with low brand reputation rather than both complimentary and constructive information. Finally, the higher the subjects’ perception of the reviewers’ honesty and caring is, the higher the consumers’ perception of review credibility.     

Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word

Using a principal-agent setting, we introduce honesty that requires pre-commitment. The principal offers a menu of mechanisms to screen ethics. Agents may misrepresent ethics. Dishonest agents may misrepresent the match with the assigned task (good or bad), while honest agents reveal the match honestly if they have pre-committed. Ethics-screening, that allows for match-screening with dishonest agents while leaving a lower rent to honest agents, is optimal if both honesty and a good match are likely. Otherwise the optimal mechanism is the standard second-best or the first-best (where dishonest agents misrepresent the match), if dishonesty is likely or unlikely respectively.An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Honest Agents and Equilibrium Lies.” We are grateful to seminar participants at MIT, Université de Caen, University of St Andrews, University of Virginia, and ESEM 99, and two anonymous referees for useful comments.