零售产业通路费现象及我国公共政策的选择

国内外有关零售产业通路费是促进竞争还是限制竞争的争论存在重大分歧。这些分歧导致政府无法为通路费建立和实施一个明确的指导方针 ,而只能根据已有的反垄断法对具体的案例进行裁决。现阶段 ,我国通路费运作中存在许多问题 ,比如名目繁多 ,且收取过程中存在违法行为等等。因此 ,我国政府应加强调查研究 ,尽快制定相关法律规范通路费的运作     

论我国企业合并的反垄断控制

过度的企业合并会限制甚至消灭市场竞争,因此,保持市场的有效竞争需要反垄断立法。反垄断法合并控制应关注整 体经济效率;合并控制的实质性标准是产生或加强市场支配地位;而符合反垄断禁止标准同时又存在法定豁免事由的的合并有 可能会被批准     

企业在同质产品市场的差异化战略行为——一个对我国反垄断立法的产业组织理论解释

我国在加入WTO后,一些重要的服务领域面临着全面对外开放。由于转换成本的存在,使得该领域中本来在购买前功能相近的同质商品或服务,在购买后成为异质的商品。企业因而拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断的权力。为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者。这既缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,也在整体上将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平。它可能会降低社会效率和消费者福利。文章通过分析企业间在同质商品市场竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在我国该领域反垄断立法提供了理论解释。     

The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function

This paper examines the efficiency and price effects of mergers by applying a frontier profit function to data on bank megamergers. We find that merged banks experience a statistically significant 16 percentage point average increase in profit efficiency rank relative to other large banks. Most of the improvement is from increasing revenues, including a shift in outputs from securities to loans, a higher-valued product. Improvements were greatest for the banks with the lowest efficiencies prior to merging, who therefore had the greatest capacity for improvement. By comparison, the effects on profits from merger-related changes in prices were found to be very small.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

美国反垄断的经济学思考

众所周知,国际上垄断的主要形式是托拉斯,而美国这个崇尚自由竞争的经济大国,其垄断行为更为普遍。美国反垄断法的出台及实施,引起了我们更多的经济学思考,研究借鉴美国反垄断法的构成体系、主要内容以及典型的实施案例,对我国反垄断理论的研究和实践将有所裨益。     

Beyond antitrust populism: Towards robust antitrust

The populist use of competition policies is on the rise again, associated with the growth of big-tech companies in the era of digital platforms. This article sees antitrust populism as a re-emerging force in the United States and Europe via greater politicisation of competition law enforcement. It addresses the basic tenets of antitrust populism in order to expose the fundamental problems that populist use of competition law entails. I argue for a rethink of antitrust policy on the intellectual foundations laid down by what Mark Pennington describes as ‘robust political economy’. We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously.     

The Determinants of Tying Litigation, 1961–2001

The idea that changes in Supreme Court decision rules should have measurable effects on the volume of cases litigated has a compelling plausibility, and several models of litigation predict this result. The prediction is a fragile one, however, because it implies very restrictive assumptions about the probability distributions of the cases subject to dispute. The period studied includes four Supreme Court decisions widely regarded as changing the rules and altering the level of uncertainty surrounding the legality of the anti-tying provisions of the antitrust laws. Broad trends in antitrust activity generally and changes in firm profitability statistically explain over three-quarters of the observed variation in tying litigation. Changes in legal precedent have only modest effects upon litigation.

产业结构趋同背景下的行政地区垄断探析

生产要素能够在同一市场中自由流通是市场经济的内在要求,行政地区垄断无疑阻碍了市场经济的发展。行政地区垄断总是与地方政府的利益联系着,产业结构趋同迫使地方政府为了地方利益最大化滥用行政权力限制市场竞争,产业结构趋同能够催生出行政地区垄断。同时由于我国反垄断法律制度的不完善和对行政地区垄断的打击力度相对不足,在客观上纵容了行政地区垄断。解决产业结构趋同背景下的行政地区垄断之道是创新法律制度,即建立诱导地方政府发展地方优势产业的克拉克机制和加强打击行政地区垄断的省际诉讼模式。     

Cooperation In R&D With Spillovers And Delegation Of Sales ∗

Cooperation in several phases of the innovation process is viewed by antitrust authorities with suspicion. They face the dilemma between providing the right incentives for the appro-priability of returns to R&D and the risks of diminishing product market competition. The current legislation in the European Union and the United States gives special treatment to cooperation in R&D and the joint exploitation of results (extended cooperation).

We study several collusive regimes for a class of examples in which vertical relations are explicitly introduced. Regarding antitrust policy implications we fmd that: a) there is an ana-lytical justification to a ‘rule of reason’ treatment for extended cooperation in research joint ventures and, b) individual exemptions, though restrictive of competition, might be welfare improving.