Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

Reelection,growth and public debt

In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt.     

Myopic market pricing and managerial myopia

This paper develops a firm‐level measure of myopic market pricing, which captures the extent to which the market overvalues short‐term expected abnormal earnings relative to longer‐term ones. The empirical analysis shows that myopically priced firms manage earnings more actively and invest less in R&D. The impact of myopic market pricing is concentrated in firms where managers cater more to market pricing, that is, in firms with greater short‐term investor ownership, with CEO compensation that is more sensitive to the firm share price, and with higher equity dependence. Additional tests show that these findings are robust to the consideration of market (under)overpricing. The results suggest that when managers cater to market pricing, market myopia encourages managerial myopia.     

浅谈渐进多焦点配装眼镜

近年来随着人们生活质量的改善、专业需求的不断提高,以及广告宣传的大力推广、眼镜技术的不断发展和验光装配技术水平的提高,渐进多焦点眼镜镜以其优越的性能、日趋成熟的技术,为越来越多的人们所接受,更是成为了广大中老年屈光不正患者和青少年近视眼患者的首选。     

论“共主体”营销话语的建构与践行——关于现代营销近视症的矫治研究

本文针对当前营销理论和实践存在的"外形化"问题,梳理了莱维特提出营销近视症后的营销理论发展进路,得出该近视症并没有得到根治而且有新变异的论断和具有主体中心论特征与弊端的现代营销近视症;认为要根治该近视症,首先应克服"现代营销者研究现代营销"以及由此产生的"营销研究的近视症"局限,以营销研究者的身份、在跨学科和方法论高度与层面去寻求突破性思路和方法。基于这种认识,本文萃取和应用"后现代性"、"主体间性"与"网络嵌入性"等多学科话语作为矫治这种营销近视症的创新方法,重构了具有"消解对立、善待他者、与他者网络化互嵌共生"意蕴的共主体营销新话语,并论述了践行这种营销新话语的方式、机理和愿景。     

Crafting customer insight: What we can learn from the revival of the vinyl record

The recent resurgence of the vinyl record and the proliferation of so-called craft and artisanal products offer unique opportunities to observe ongoing shifts in the contemporary consumer’s values and attitudes. In this article, we explore such thought-provoking market developments and their implications by contrasting them with the conventional understanding of markets and consumers. This understanding can lead to marketing myopia as it works from the utility-oriented assumption that what ultimately matters for both the company and the customer is cost efficiency and convenience. Against this backdrop, in this article, we discuss how market developments representing the contemporary consumer’s mindset prove valuable in creating customer insight that highlights aspects often obscured by an exaggerated focus on cost efficiency and convenience. We provide an alternative approach to evaluating markets and consumers that encourages companies to build their customer-centric market strategies around questions of context, authenticity, story, and resonance. This will help them narrow the gap between their market offerings and the actual wants and needs of their customer, and consequently allow them to revitalize their market.     

中国汽车行业经营哲学的演变与市场营销近视症评析

本文在介绍西方市场营销观念演变的基础上,着重分析我国汽车行业经营哲学的演变及市场营销近视现状,探讨预防我国汽车行业营销近视的对策。     

Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.     

Pricing as a driver of profitable growth: An agenda for CEOs and senior executives

Most CEOs take a narrow, tactical view of pricing and delegate pricing to lower levels of the organization. This myopic approach is costly, as it prevents companies from realizing their potential. In the hands of the best-run companies, pricing is not a battlefield tactic to win a particular competitive skirmish but a transformative long-term strategy for sustained competitive advantage. We present an agenda of six specific action items that defines how to unlock the power of pricing. CEOs and senior executives, our research suggests, should not set prices, but instead, they should create the context, the capabilities, the behaviors, the infrastructure, and the aspirations that enable their organization to excel in pricing.     

To Guide or Not to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance

In recent years, quarterly earnings guidance has been harshly criticized for inducing “managerial short‐termism” and other ills. Managers are, therefore, urged by influential institutions to cease guidance. We examine empirically the causes of such guidance cessation and find that poor operating performance — decreased earnings, missing analyst forecasts, and lower anticipated profitability — is the major reason firms stop quarterly guidance. After guidance cessation, we do not find an appreciable increase in long‐term investment once managers free themselves from investors’ myopia. Contrary to the claim that firms would provide more alternative, forward‐looking disclosures in lieu of the guidance, we find that such disclosures are curtailed. We also find a deterioration in the information environment of guidance stoppers in the form of increased analyst forecast errors and forecast dispersion and a decrease in analyst coverage. Taken together, our evidence indicates that guidance stoppers are primarily troubled firms and stopping guidance does not benefit either the stoppers or their investors.