Credit Ratings and Earnings Management around IPOs

This study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (EM) through accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that firms going public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income‐enhancing accrual‐based and real EM in the offering year. The monitoring by a credit rating agency (CRA) and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. We also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for CRAs to effectively restrain EM. Moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is not linked to future earnings and is negatively related to post‐issue long‐run stock performance. However, for rated issuers, at‐issue income‐increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance and is unrelated to long‐run stock performance following the offering. The evidence indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative purposes.     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

The use of earnings and operations management to avoid credit rating downgrades

Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year following the credit watch period, the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of private information about future firm performance.     

Product market competition and earnings management: A firm‐level analysis

In this paper, we employ a firm‐level measure of product market competition constructed from the textual analysis of firms’ 10‐K filings to examine the relationship between managers’ perceived competition pressure and earnings management. We find that accounting irregularities and accrual‐based earnings management are positively related to product market competition. This finding is consistent with the notion that competition pressure increases managerial incentives to manage earnings, due to their career concerns. We also find that real earnings management is negatively related to product market competition. This finding suggests that real earnings management involves actions that decrease firms’ competitiveness and thus is costly for firms confronted with high competition pressure.     

The effect of relative performance evaluation on earnings management: a game-theoretic approach

Because investors and creditors often compare the financial statements of similar or competing firms when deciding how to allocate their funds, it is likely that a firm's financial well-being depends on how well it performs relative to its rivals. In this paper, we consider the problem of earnings management as a non-cooperative game among several firms, in which each firm seeks a comparison advantage through its financial statement numbers. Our model indicates that firms may exaggerate their earnings in a world driven by multi-firm-comparisons simply because they expect other firms to do so. Thus, very little may be needed for earnings management to emerge in the Nash equilibrium. Our results hold under the following conditions. First, investors and creditors are not able to unravel the earnings management, thus ensuring that some information asymmetry remains. Second, investors and creditors make inter-firm comparisons when assessing firm value. Third, firms care about their own fundamental value as well as the market's perception about firm value. We also show that the equilibrium amount of earnings management depends on the characteristics of the earnings management technique itself and on the proportion of stockholders who are long-term investors in the firm.     

Management by the Numbers: A Formal Approach to Deriving Informational and Distributional Properties of “Unmanaged” Earnings

We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of earnings frequency distributions under the assumption that managers use unbiased accounting information to sequentially decide on real options their firms have and report generated earnings truthfully, with the market pricing the firm based on those reported earnings. We generate benchmarks against which empirically observed earnings‐returns relations and aggregate earnings distributions can be evaluated. This parsimonious model shows a coherent set of results: reported losses are less persistent than reported gains, decision making diminishes the S‐shaped market response to earnings and earnings relate to returns asymmetrically in the way documented by Basu [1997]. Furthermore, the implied frequency distribution of aggregate earnings is neither symmetric nor necessarily single‐peaked. Instead, it may exhibit a kink at zero and look similar to the plots reported by Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]. However, within our model, none of these phenomena are due to reporting noise, bias, or some undesirable strategic managerial behavior. They are the natural consequences of using past earnings as the basis for value increasing managerial decision making that in turn generates the future earnings on which future decisions will be based.     

Intra-Industry Effects of Earnings Restatements Due to Accounting Irregularities

Abstract:  This paper investigates the intra-industry effects of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities. We detect a significant contagion effect for rival firms whose cash flow characteristics are similar to those of the restating firm. The restatement doesn't seem to influence all the firms in the industry or firms that have a high probability of involving the same type of accounting irregularity as the restating firm does. We do not detect any competitive effect; nor do we find a significant change in the implied cost of equity capital of the rival firms, suggesting that the contagion effect is due to the revision in the expected short-run future earnings of the rival firms.     

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Whether managers should provide earnings guidance, especially quarterly guidance, has been a hotly debated policy issue. Influential organizations have urged firms to stop providing earnings guidance to reduce earnings fixation and short‐termism in the capital markets. Little attention has been paid to an alternative proposal: instead of ceasing earnings guidance, companies could provide disaggregated earnings guidance. No archival evidence exists regarding the determinants of disaggregated earnings guidance and its effects on the firm and its information environment. We find that once managers provide guidance, the decision to disaggregate this guidance is primarily driven by demand‐and‐supply factors that exhibit little change from year to year rather than by strategic factors. We find more timely analyst forecast revisions (with no compromise of forecast accuracy), a greater magnitude of revisions, and a larger reduction in analyst disagreement for disaggregating firms than for non‐disaggregating firms. These findings suggest that disaggregation enriches a firm's information environment. We also find that disaggregation helps managers align analyst expectations with their own, but firms are punished by investors for providing multiple performance targets but missing them.     

Stock market listing status and real earnings management

This study analyzes real earnings management among privately held versus publicly listed firms. Our first finding is that public firms engage in more earnings management through operating activities. When a clear incentive to manage earnings in a specific direction is present we continue to find that public firms manage their earnings more than private firms. We reason that capital market pressure and ownership characteristics drive our results. Additional analyses reveal that public firms employ more real earnings management as a proportion of the total earnings management strategy. Furthermore, we find that mitigating factors of real earnings management have stronger impact in public firms. This study contributes to literature on non-accrual earnings management and to the broader understanding about the private vis-à-vis public firm reporting and operating behavior. Finally, we contribute by identifying an important societal cost of stock market listing, which is the increase in potentially value-destroying real earnings management.     

Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings Management

Prior research suggests that managers may use earnings management to meet voluntary earnings forecasts. We document the extent of earnings management undertaken within Canadian Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and study the extent to which companies with better corporate governance systems are less likely to use earnings management to achieve their earnings forecasts. In addition, we test other factors that differentiate forecasting from non‐forecasting firms, and assess the impact of forecasting and corporate governance on future cash flow prediction. We find that firms with better corporate governance are less likely to include a voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus. In addition, we find that while IPO firms use accruals management to meet forecasts; the informativeness of the discretionary accruals depends on whether or not the firm would have missed its forecast without the use of discretionary accruals.     

Detecting Target‐Driven Earnings Management Based on the Distribution of Digits

We present a novel research design to detect target‐driven earnings management in accounting data. As a particular concern in this line of research, information about the exact earnings target value of a given firm is often not available. We therefore develop an empirical strategy that does not require such information. To this end, we rely on the concept of the distribution of digits rather than the distribution of the earnings metric itself. We then theoretically derive that the mean of the distribution of digits, in particular, exhibits a specific pattern around the earnings target that can be exploited to investigate target‐driven earnings management. This pattern arises regardless of the distribution of digits that obtains in unmanaged data. We extensively test our theoretical predictions using both simulated and archival data.     

Debt Financing and Earnings Management: An Internal Capital Market Perspective

This paper investigates the role internal capital markets play in mitigating earnings management of group firms. We predict that the funding advantages of internal capital markets from business affiliates obscure solvency problems resulting from higher leverage for individual firms within a group, which in turn mitigates their incentives for earnings management. Using Taiwanese firms as a sample, we provide evidence that is consistent with such a prediction. In particular, we show that higher group profitability reduces its member firms’ sensitivity of earnings management to debt levels. Among business groups, earnings management in pyramidal groups is less sensitive to debt levels. We also find that the debt‐abnormal accrual curve becomes smoother as group profitability increases when considering the non‐monotonic relationship between firm leverage and earnings management.     

Earnings Management During Antidumping Investigations in Europe: Sample‐Wide and Cross‐Sectional Evidence

This paper examines earnings management by EU firms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first document economically and statistically significant income‐decreasing earnings management around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show that earnings management increases when accounting data directly affect the magnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find that earnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases or as the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free‐rider and coordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when the petition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioning firm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. We document that raising equity or debt financing moderates income‐decreasing earnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade off capital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate that contemporary research methods can detect accruals‐based earnings management in settings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearly identified.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

Options trades,short sales and real earnings management

We study the link between measures of stock options’ volatility and firms’ real earnings management (RM). We hypothesise that RM causes uncertainty in the value of a firm’s common stock and, as a result, increases the volatility spread and skew of the firm’s options. Spread and skew proxy for investors’ uncertainty in the value of the options underlying a stock. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find an association between a firm’s use of RM, and the volatility spread and skew in the firm’s options, more precisely in its put options. We also study the link between short selling and the extent of RM but do not find a consistent relationship between the two.     

Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective

Earnings management has been cast into negative light due to the recent corporate scandals and, therefore, is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Enron and Worldcom represent two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. However, some argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public. We offer agency theory as a tool to distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management. The empirical evidence suggests that firms where earnings management occurs to a larger (less) extent suffer less (more) agency costs. Moreover, a positive relation is documented between firm value and the extent of earnings management. Taken together, the results reveal that earnings management is, on average, not detrimental.     

Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View

We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.     

Two tales of earnings management with short sales deregulation

We study the impact of short sales on accrual-based and real earnings management (EM). Based on the costs and benefits of using EM to hide negative information, we derive an analytical model showing that there are two possibilities: (1) a firm engages in less accrual-based and real EM when facing short-seller scrutiny (the informational efficiency hypothesis), or (2) a firm switches from accrual-based EM (a less sophisticated method) to real EM (a more sophisticated method), which we call the sophisticated information-hiding hypothesis. That is, there is a tradeoff between accrual-based and real EM in the presence of short sales. Using a natural experiment of the recent short sales deregulation in China, we show findings consistent with the latter reaction. Additional analysis suggests that the decrease in accrual-based EM and increase in real EM are driven primarily by firms with non-Big 10 auditors or firms not under shareholder or regulatory scrutiny. We interpret the findings as being consistent with the model prediction that for firms with weak inside and outside monitoring, the probability of detecting real EM is low, and thus the tradeoff between accrual-based and real EM prevails in the presence of short sales.     

Timing,earnings management and over-reaction around pure placings

This paper provides new evidence about firms conducting pure placings in the UK. It examines their abnormal performance (stock and operating), earnings management (accrual and real activities) and abnormal growth prospects for up to three years surrounding the event. It questions whether (i) timing, (ii) earnings management and/or (iii) over-reaction hypotheses can explain these performance, earnings quality and growth paths. The results document that pure placing firms have high earnings quality and abnormally high growth opportunities at the announcement. For this reason, the market is overenthusiastic. It expects more than what is eventually fulfilled, in line with the over-reaction hypothesis. Weak evidence that placing firms may exploit market timing is noted, whilst there is no supportive evidence of earnings management. These findings distinguish the earnings quality and growth opportunities of pure placing firms from that of firms conducting open offers, firm commitment offers and other seasoned equity offerings (SEO) that are not private placements, for which prior evidence reports mainly timing and/or earnings management prior to the event. This paper facilitates a better understanding of UK SEO.     

Overvaluation and earnings management: Does the degree of overvaluation matter?

We examine whether the choice of earnings management strategies employed by managers of overvalued firms depends on the degree of market overvaluation. By distinguishing between substantially overvalued (SOV) and relatively overvalued (ROV) firms, we find that SOV firms significantly inflate earnings using both accruals-based and real earnings management. In contrast, managers of ROV firms do not engage in accruals-based earnings management and their firms’ accounts tend to report higher discretionary expenses. The reported higher discretionary expenses of ROV firms are comparable to the discretionary expenses of firms in the expanding stage of their business life cycle, a pattern consistent with ROV firms increasing discretionary expenses to finance growth and hence justify the high market valuation. Overall, we show that the existing evidence on income-increasing earnings management by overvalued firms is mainly driven by the pressure to sustain the high market valuation of firms that are substantially overvalued.