Debates and dissent inside the FOMC during WWII

Abstract

We demonstrate that even though during WWII the interest rate was close to zero supporting the financing of the military effort, dissent inside the FOMC occurred with a similar frequency to other policy episodes. Our analysis highlights that the debates which resulted in dissents turned around two broad issues: the size of the Fed’s balance sheet as well as the functioning of and communication with financial markets. Thus, we argue that the conventional view depicting the Fed as merely accommodating treasury needs should be revised. Our detailed investigation of dissents emphasises the modernity of the objections raised by Fed officials.     

External regulation,independent director attendance,and governance effects

In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’ behavior, and consider the governance effect of such regulations. This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Using a difference-in-differences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017, we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE (SHIDs) has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance. This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds. Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring. The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes, and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value. In addition, SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE, and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE, which has a less constraining attendance requirement. Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.     

The Neutrality Illusion: Biased Economics,Biased Training,and Biased Monetary Policy. Testing the Role of Ideology on FOMC Voting Behaviour

This research is trying to shed light on two myths that are usually widespread: the first one being the idea of the academic economist as a neutral scientist finding uncontestable consensual truths, thanks to uncontestable empirical methods, the second, the idea of the central banker as a Weberian neutral bureaucrat setting aside personal beliefs to act mechanically for the common good. Deconstructing this ‘neutrality illusion’, this work argues that economics is actually a divided and ideologically marked discipline despite its aim at natural-science-type-legitimacy. It argues in a related discussion that such ideological bias also impedes a purely neutral conduct of monetary policy, undermining the very idea of central bank independence. Linking these two arguments, it argues that graduate training in economics is the first place for the formation of biased preferences, because of the substantial ideological sorting that exists across universities. Using a unique database on FOMC members’ votes and ideology, the paper tests this idea empirically and despite unavoidable caveats, finds robust evidence of a systematic impact of the ideological features of their alma mater on FOMC members’ voting behaviour – impact that we found more important than the other traditional determinants of central bankers’ actions.     

Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say-on-Pay

This article analyses whether the transition from the 2004 CLERP 9 advisory Say-on-Pay regime to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in 2012 influenced CEO pay in Australian firms. Analysing a panel of 2,074 firm-years (2005–2015), we find that (i) CEO pay is a positive predictor of shareholder dissent; (ii) firm performance has a reducing effect on shareholder dissent; (iii) excessive shareholder dissent moderated CEO pay under the ‘Two Strikes’ rule relative to the CLERP 9 regime, and (iv) the market responded favourably to the introduction of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule and negatively to ‘strike’ instances after its introduction.     

Douglas Copland's Battle With The Younger Brethren of Economists

This article discusses the problematic relationship between Douglas Copland and the new generation of post‐war Australian economists. Copland felt that their view of economic policy was contrary to Australia's best interests. The critique and feud was to last right up till Copland's retirement. The article shows how Copland's views differed from those of inside economists and therefore the official policy line.     

A History of the Founding and Early Years of AFEE

During the late 1950s, institutionalists started organizing themselves amid the decline of institutional economics, leading to the 1965 founding of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE). We analyze the history of the movement to found AFEE and its early years. We use archival evidence, much of it previously unpublished, to provide a detailed history of these early years. We also present an account of AFEE that highlights the role of different interpretations of institutional economics in building the association. In addition, we provide a brief history of the early years of the Journal of Economic Issues (JEI).     

The incidence of wrongdoing,whistle-blowing,and retaliation: Results of a naturally occurring field experiment

The present study examined two general research questions pertaining to the passage of a law designed to encourage whistle-blowing: (a) Has the incidence of perceived wrongdoing, whistle-blowing, anonymous whistle-blowing, or retaliation changed following the passage of the law? (b) What variables predict the comprehensiveness of retaliation that identified whistle-blowers claim to have experienced? One questionnaire was mailed to members of 15 organizations affected by the law in 1980 (n=8500) and a second was administered in 1983 (n=4700). There was some evidence that the law had beneficial effects; specifically, the incidence of perceived wrongdoing declined and whistle-blowing increased. Unfortunately, identified whistle-blowers were just as likely to experience retaliation in 1983 as they were in 1980. The predictors of the comprehensiveness of the retaliation experienced were generally the same in both years. The results tentatively suggest that more legal and organizational encouragement of whistle-blowing is needed.     

The dissent voting behaviour of central bankers: what do we really know?

We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, the UK and the US. In contrast to previous studies, we consider 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psychological or preference-related factors jointly and use Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to formally assess the attendant model uncertainty. We find that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% for the examined central banks. Our results suggest that most of the examined regressors, including factors that capture the effects of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent. This result suggests that unobserved characteristics of central bankers and different communication strategies drive the dissent, rather than the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

The Power of One: Dissent and Organizational Life

Over the last 20 years, organizations have attempted numerous innovations to create more openness and to increase ethical practice. However, adult students in business classes report that managers are generally bureaucratically oriented and averse to constructive criticism or principled dissent. When organizations oppose dissent, they suffer the consequences of mistakes that could be prevented and they create an unethical and toxic environment for individual employees. By distinguishing principled dissent from other forms of criticism and opposition, managers and leaders can perceive the dissenter as an important organizational voice and a valued employee. The dissenter, like the whistleblower, is often highly ethically motivated and desires to contribute to the organization’s wellbeing. Recognizing and protecting principled dissent provides the means of transforming organizations. By restoring dignity to the individual, organizations gain more productive and loyal employees, and they create an environment that promotes critical thinking, learning, and a commitment to ethics. Dr. Nasrin Shahinpoor is an Associate Professor of Economics at Hanover College in Hanover, IN. Dr. Bernard F. Matt is Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Wilmington College—Cincinnati Branch in Cincinnati, OH.     

Expressive Shareholder Democracy: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Dissent in 15 Western European Countries

This study develops an expressive understanding of shareholder dissent. In this view, shareholder dissent is not only about the voting outcomes of proposals put to the vote, but also expresses an evaluation of the firm's corporate governance set‐up. We hypothesize that shareholder dissent expresses an agency theoretical evaluation of corporate governance, but that the degree to which the capitalist system of a country is a coordinated market economy (CME) leads shareholders to evaluate corporate governance more in team production terms. We test our theoretical model using multilevel techniques on a sample of 12,513 proposals voted on in 717 firms listed in 15 Western European countries and find support for our predictions. Our study not only contributes to a better understanding of the corporate governance role of shareholder dissent, but also shows that what shareholders express through dissent differs across national contexts.