Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

Learning across the life cycle: Experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads

Guided by notions from the literature on organizational learning, this paper investigates how product line experimentation and organizational performance change across the careers of top managers. Its subjects are the studio heads who ran all the major Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. The study found first, that product line experimentation declines over the course of executive tenures; second, that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between top executive tenure and an organization's financial performance; and third, that product line experimentation is more likely to benefit financial performance late in top executives' tenures. These findings are consistent with a three‐stage ‘executive life cycle’. During the early years of their tenures, top managers experiment intensively with their product lines to learn about their business; later on their accumulated knowledge allows them to reduce experimentation and increase performance; finally, in their last years, executives reduce experimentation still further, and performance declines. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of competitive context on consumer response to price changes

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to understand how a brand’s price level, relative to its competitors, will affect consumers’ responses to price changes of the brand. The study uses experiments to examine brand choice responses to price increases and decreases across contexts differing in competitor brands and their respective prices. These experiments are conducted with six consumer goods categories. The research identifies three key factors that affect the size of responses to brand price changes – (1) passing a competitor brand’s price, (2) narrowing versus widening the price gaps with competitors, and (3) whether competitors are predominantly higher or lower priced brands.     

Asset accumulation,interdependence and technological change: evidence from pharmaceutical drug discovery

Although the resource‐based view of the firm has been written about extensively, the process by which firm assets are accumulated has not been explored in detail. That is, we know little about the micro‐level mechanisms by which assets are built, nor do we have sufficient empirical evidence why some assets are more difficult to imitate, trade, or substitute. In this exploratory paper, we attempt to provide a better understanding of asset accumulation via an empirical research program in pharmaceutical drug discovery. Using a combination of field research, discovery data from nine pharmaceutical firms, and data on 218 alliances involving new technologies for experimentation and testing, three causes affecting asset accumulation are identified and described. First, the difficulty of imitating a particular asset is affected by interdependencies with other assets. Second, trading of assets can be impeded by structural inertia in the core of a firm that is adopting the technology asset. And third, fully specifying all factors affecting imitation and trading ex ante is very difficult, if not nearly impossible, under conditions of rapid technological change. We propose that the complex interactions of these causes can give rise to imperfections in factor markets. Finally, implications for further research are discussed as well. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence of play (the period-by-period behavior as well as the long-run frequency) to Nash equilibria of the one-shot stage game, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random experimentation some recall, or memory, is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.     

Genetic Information in Agricultural Productivity and Product Development

Two prominent features of recent changes in agriculture have been the advent of precision breeding techniques and an increase in the level of information netputs in production. This article identifies ways in which these features may complement in expanding the variety of processed products, level of productivity, and rate of change in productivity. Using a martingale concept of information, we identify conditions under which information increases the incentives to invest and engage in product differentiation activities. A theory on how genetic uniformity can enhance the rate of learning through process experimentation, and so the rate of technical change, is developed.     

Thought experimentation and the Phillips curve

This paper offers the rationale for presenting a particular type of Phillips curve and develops the dynamic behavior of an economy where such a Phillips curve relation is observed. The specific kind of relation that is explored has similarities with the sticky-information Phillips curve of the Mankiw-Reis framework. Nevertheless, it adds an important dimension: firms need to form expectations about current events on past time periods not because of infrequent optimal updating of information but because producers want to evaluate the possibility of taking advantage of information deficiencies on the consumers’ side. A positive probability of ‘fooling’ consumers with a price above the one imposed by market conditions re-shapes the dynamic relation between the inflation rate and the output gap.     

Impact of walking speed on tourist carrying capacity: The case of Maiji Mountain Grottoes,China

This paper analyzes the impact of walking speed on tourist carrying capacity. To do so, a combination of simulation experimentation and on-the-ground experiment is suggested to work in a study case, Maiji Mountain Grottoes, China. The simulation findings indicate that walking speed has a negative impact on tourist carrying capacity and the correlation coefficient is 0.64, for the reason that walking takes up more space. The on-the-ground experiment shows that carrying capacity is not a unified limit all over a destination, but changeable temporally and spatially, and its estimation needs to be adjusted according to the minimum area required per tourist and tourist activity. The method applied in this paper and the simulation findings can serve as a methodological tool for further research about tourist carrying capacity where the main activity of tourists is walking while watching.     

Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation

We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.