基于演化博弈视角下的耕地重金属污染治理式休耕问题研究

在研究治理式休耕相关利益群体逻辑关系的基础上,构建农户群体和地方政府的演化博弈模型,分别研究未引入中央政府“约束-激励”机制和引入“约束-激励”机制下的主体行为特征及其影响因素,讨论不同情景下农户群体与地方政府的决策行为。研究结果表明,在未引入中央政府“约束-激励”机制的情况下,农户群体通过权衡休耕收益和机会成本进行决策,当休耕的净收益为正时,即使没有地方政府补偿,农户群体仍然有足够的动力去休耕,当净收益为负时,农民与地方政府容易陷入治理式休耕的“囚徒困境”,而“约束-激励”机制的引入可以推动休耕补偿的帕累托改进,通过提高农户群体收益以及对地方政府进行严格的违规处罚实现最优稳定均衡策略。

Research on Fallow of Farmland Contaminated Problems with Heavy Metals from the Perspective of Evolutionary Games

In this paper,we developed an evolutionary game model of farmers and local governments based on the analysis of the logical relationship between the relevant interest groups of governance type fallow.We analyzed the characteristics and influencing factors of the behavior of the main body under different scenarios with and without the“constraintmotivation”mechanism respectively.The game decision-making behavior of farmers and local governments under different conditions is discussed.The results indicated that farmers make decisions by weighing the benefits of fallow and opportunity costs without the introduction of the central government’s“restriction-incentive”.When the net benefits of fallow are positive,even without local government compensation,farmers still have enough motivation to fallow.When the net benefits are negative,farmers and local governments,the two government groups are likely to fall into the Prisoner’s Dilemma of regulatory strategies.The introduction of“constraint-incentive”mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement of fallow compensation,and an optimal stable equilibrium strategy can be achieved through improving the income of farmers and strict punishment of local governments.