| 城市公共服务市场化与定价管制 |
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| 引用本文： | 王传荣,安丰东.城市公共服务市场化与定价管制[J].财经科学,2009(7). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王传荣 安丰东 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 山东财政学院,济南,250014
2. 山东财政学院经济学院,济南,250014 |
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| 摘 要： | 投资博弈模型表明,在城市公共服务产品的价格无法预知的条件下,只有给投资商预定的利润率才能吸引资本进入,而预定的利润率却进一步降低了成本激励.基础设施供给厂商和规制者合谋的子博弈完美纳什均衡表明,预定的投资收益率管制并非激励相客机制,直接管制定价反映出城市公共服务产品产业的低效率、高成本、高价格状态,远远偏离于政府管制的消费者福利最优化的初衷.
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| 关 键 词： | 市场化 投资博彝 成本加成 城市公共服务产品 |
The Marketing of City Infrastructure:Investment Game,Behavior Choice and Regulation |
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| Wang Chuanrong,An Fengdong.The Marketing of City Infrastructure:Investment Game,Behavior Choice and Regulation[J].Finance and Economics,2009(7). |
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| Authors: | Wang Chuanrong An Fengdong |
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| Institution: | Wang Chuanrong1 An Fengdong2 |
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| Abstract: | On the condition that infrastructure price are not predicted,investment game model demonstrate that all kinds of capital will not enter for investment unless there are scheduled profit margins,which will reduce the stimulating of decreasing cost.Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium between the supplier of infrastructure firm and regulator manifests cost addition pricing method is not stimulating compatible system,although it is more suitable for the marketing price innovation of our country.Directly regulating... |
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| Keywords: | Marketing Investment Game Cost Addition Urban Infrastructure |
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