| 我国融资租赁行业风险的阶段性特征——来自不完全合同与演化博弈的理论解释 |
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| 引用本文： | 崔佳宁,史燕平.我国融资租赁行业风险的阶段性特征——来自不完全合同与演化博弈的理论解释[J].技术经济,2020,39(5):149-155. |
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| 作者姓名： | 崔佳宁 史燕平 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京联合大学 商务学院,北京 100025;对外经济贸易大学 国际经济贸易学院,北京 100029 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过不完全合同与演化博弈理论对我国融资租赁业发展过程中的波动以及当前的不稳定状态进行了解释。研究表明,从长期看,我国融资租赁业发展中的剧烈波动源于参与方的不断变动;而从短期看,现阶段我国融资租赁业的不稳定源于竞争结构与交易方式的不合理。因此在政策层面上,统一监管与出台《融资租赁法》成为当务之急。
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| 关 键 词： | 融资租赁 不完全合同 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019/12/3 0:00:00 |
| 修稿时间： | 2020/5/30 0:00:00 |
The Periodic Characteristics of China's Financial Leasing Industry Risk:An Explanation of Incomplete Contract and Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| Institution: | School of business, Beijing Union University |
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| Abstract: | This study explain the fluctuation and instability of China''s leasing industry by the theory of in complete contract and evolutionary economics. The result shows that the fluctuation of China''s leasing industry is caused by volatility of different parties in the long run. but for the short term .the mess of China''s leasing industry is due to the unreasonable competition structure and trading mode. And from the policy perspective. the unified supervision and the introduction of the financial leasing law has become a curtail thing. |
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| Keywords: | financial leasing in complete contract evolutionary economics |
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