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资本约束、激励相容与银行业监管
引用本文:李红坤.资本约束、激励相容与银行业监管[J].金融论坛,2007,12(5):19-25.
作者姓名:李红坤
作者单位:山东经济学院财政金融学院,济南,250014
摘    要:金融风险可以划分为商业性金融风险和制度性金融风险.制度性金融风险是我国银行业面临的最主要风险,因此银行监管激励相容度是更适合我国国情的概念.在银行发展史上,呈现出两种迥异的银行成长模式:一种是资金约束型的数量成长模式;一种是资本约束型的质量成长模式,资本约束型的质量成长模式是商业银行的必然选择.资本约束机制与激励相容机制共同发挥作用是银行监管激励与约束机制有效运作的必要条件.激励相容和资本约束要以监管绩效为基础协调发挥作用、不可分割.资本约束与激励相容理念不仅体现在理论研究中,而且体现在国际银行业监管实践中.

关 键 词:激励相容  资本约束  巴塞尔协议  制度性金融风险

Capital Restraint, Incentive Compatibility and Banking Supervision
LI Hong-kun.Capital Restraint, Incentive Compatibility and Banking Supervision[J].Finance Forum,2007,12(5):19-25.
Authors:LI Hong-kun
Institution:LI Hong-kun
Abstract:Financial risks can be classified into commercial financial risk and institutional financial risk with the latter being the major risk faced by our banking industry. Therefore, banking supervision and incentive compatibility suit better China's specific conditions. In the history of banking development, there are two dimensionally different modes of banking growth: one is the capital-restrained quantitative mode and the other is the capital-restrained qualitative mode, which is a must choice by commercial banks. Co-functioning of capital restraint and incentive compatibility mechanism serves as a requisite for effective adoption of banking supervision incentive and restraint mechanism. Incentive compatibility and capital restraint should be coordinated rather than separated when supervisory performance is considered. The concept of capital restraint and incentive compatibility exists not only in theory but also in the practice of international banking supervision.
Keywords:incentive compatibility  capital restraint  Basle Accord  systemic financial risk
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