| 国有企业建立激励约束机制的制度性障碍分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王叙果.国有企业建立激励约束机制的制度性障碍分析[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2004(10):48-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王叙果 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京审计学院 南京210029 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家审计署审计科研项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 委托代理理论揭示了国有企业低效率的原因,指明了国有企业改革的方向,即建立激励与约束机制.但是该理论在中国的运用遇到了制度性障碍.本文试图分析制度性障碍产生的根源,以及弱化和解决制度性障碍的办法,期望对国有企业改革有所启示.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 制度性障碍 国有企业改革 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1549(2004)10-0048-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年8月27日 |
The Analyses of Barriers in Regime:The State-owed Enterprises Formulate Their Incentive-restriction Mechanisms |
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| WANG,Xu-guo.The Analyses of Barriers in Regime:The State-owed Enterprises Formulate Their Incentive-restriction Mechanisms[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2004(10):48-51. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xu-guo |
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| Institution: | WANG Xu-guo |
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| Abstract: | The principal-agent theory points out the reasons of state-owned enterprises' low efficiency and reclaims the state-owned enterprises should reform by formulating their incentive - restriction mechanisms.But there are some barriers in the application of the theory in China This paper analyzes the reasons and puts forward the methods weakening and solving the barriers.All this will be helpful to the reform of state-owed enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | Principal-agent The barriers of regime The reform of state-owned enterprises |
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