| 员工反生产行为组织控制的演化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 毛军权,汤馥萍.员工反生产行为组织控制的演化博弈分析[J].经济与管理,2012,26(1):43-47. |
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| 作者姓名： | 毛军权 汤馥萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中共上海市委党校现代人力资源测评研究中心,上海,200233
2. 上海理工大学管理学院,上海,200093 |
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| 基金项目： | 上海市研究生创新基金，中共上海市委党校、上海行政学院引进人才科研启动项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于演化博弈理论和员工反生产行为组织控制的行为博弈演化过程,构建企业与员工共同参与的演化博弈模型.博弈的复制动态方程表明:员工选择显性反生产行为的比例、员工因选择反生产行为所获得的额外收益、企业对员工的反生产行为进行监管所投入的成本,企业观测到员工选择反生产行为时所作出的处罚都将对博弈均衡的结果产生影响.对此,应加强人力资源管理,加大组织支持力度,建立有效的控制机制.
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| 关 键 词： | 反生产行为 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 组织控制 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Organization Control over Employee Counterproductive Behavior |
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| Mao Junquan
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Tang Fuping.Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Organization Control over Employee Counterproductive Behavior[J].Economy and Management,2012,26(1):43-47. |
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| Authors: | Mao Junquan Tang Fuping |
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| Institution: | 1.Research Center for Modern Human Resource Evaluation,Shanghai Party Institute of CPC & Shanghai Administration Institute,Shanghai 200233,China; 2.Management School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based the evolutionary game theory and the behavior game evolutionary process of the employee counterproductive work behavior organization control,the author constructs a evolutionary game model mutually participated by the enterprise and employees.The replicated dynamic equation of game theory demonstrates that the rate of positive counter-productive behavior chosen by employees and the extra gain derived from the choice of such behavior,the cost paid by enterprises for supervising employees’ counterproductive work behavior and the punishment of such behavior all impact the result of game equilibrium.So we should strengthen the human resource management,enlarge the support vigor and set up the effective control mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | counterproductive work behavior evolutionary game evolutionary stable strategy organization control |
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