首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究
引用本文:冉翠玲,杨桂元.基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究[J].技术经济,2007,26(11):66-69.
作者姓名:冉翠玲  杨桂元
作者单位:安徽财经大学,统计与应用数学学院,安徽,蚌埠,233030
基金项目:安徽省教育厅自然科学基金(kj2007b084);安徽财经大学青年教师科研项目(ACKYQ0727)
摘    要:针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。

关 键 词:供应链管理  需求信息不对称  激励相容机制  折扣策略  仿真
文章编号:1002-980X(2007)11-0066-04
修稿时间:2007-05-25

Incentive Mechanism in Supply Chain Management based on Asymmetric Demand Information
RAN Cui-ling,YANG Gui-yuan.Incentive Mechanism in Supply Chain Management based on Asymmetric Demand Information[J].Technology Economics,2007,26(11):66-69.
Authors:RAN Cui-ling  YANG Gui-yuan
Abstract:An incentive mechanism model with symmetric demand information is proposed for a supply chain that consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Based on such a symmetric demand information model, a discounting model under two parties having asym-metric demand information is built. This model considers the problem of how the manufacturer designs an incentive mechanism to prevent the retailer from providing false information and realize Win-Win.We verify numerically that:(i) the proposed policy is valid; (ii) it not only makes the manufacturer's profit better but also enhances the retailer's profit.
Keywords:supply chain management  asymmetric demand information  incentive mechanism  discounted policy  simulation
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《技术经济》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《技术经济》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号