审计失败中的审计责任认定与监管倾向:经验分析

监管者对审计责任的认定倾向是审计执业环境的重要构成。本文选取1999—2006年间中国证券市场发生的72例财务报表审计失败进行观测,发现:(1)在监管实践较早期间(1999—2002年间)的审计失败样本观测中,88.2%的审计师遭到处罚;而2003—2006年间的审计失败观测中仅有23.6%的审计师遭到处罚;(2)在控制了审计失败观测的公司受处罚严厉度、舞弊期跨度、舞弊期间审计意见类型以及审计师规模后,仍能检测到近年来审计责任认定的显著缓和趋势;(3)即使对于审计师受到处罚的审计失败观测,在1999—2002年间平均82.7%的虚假陈述事项需要由审计师承担审计责任,而在2003—2006年间仅有平均41.2%的虚假陈述事项须由审计师承担责任。综上,监管机构在近年来对会计师事务所或签字注册会计师的审计责任认定显著趋于缓和与稳健;审计执业环境的这种变化趋势亦可为未来监管和司法实践中的审计责任界定提供有益的借鉴。

Regulatory Propensity toward Auditor Liability in Audit Failures: An Empirical Analysis

Regulatory propensity toward auditor liability constructs an important element of auditor practicing environment.Using 72 financial audit failures in Chinese securities market during 1999—2006,I find that,firstly the regulator sentences an auditor as liable for an audit failure among 88.2%(23.6%) of audit failure observations in the earlier(latter) period 1999—2002(2003—2006).Secondly,the result holds when controlling for the severity of corporate sanctions,fraud spanning period,auditor opinion type during the fraud,and the auditor size.Thirdly,even for those auditor-liable observations,the auditor should be liable for an average of 82.7%(41.2%) of accused fraudulent misconducts in the earlier(latter) period.In conclusion,this paper documents a significantly relieving trend of regulatory propensity toward auditor liability,contributing evidence of a significant change in recent Chinese auditing environment.