反倾销争端与外国对华的歧视待遇--基于博弈论视角的解析

从动态博弈的角度看,进口国想方设法地加大出口商的在反倾销中的成本,是使得反倾销威胁变得可置信的一种“承诺行动;”外国对华涉案出口企业不区别征税是我国企业应诉积极性不高的重要原因;西方国家对华反倾销特点形成的主要原因是外国对华的歧视待遇。西方对华的歧视待遇实质上是增加其反倾销威胁的可信性的重要手段,改变这样的状况需要相当的努力和智慧。

Disputes over Anti-dumping Action and Discrimination against Chinese Products abroad--An Analytical Interpretation based on Game Theory

From the perspective of dynamic gambling,importing countries wish to maximize in all possible ways the cost entailed by exporting countries in an anti-dumping dispute.This turns an anti-dumping action into a credible " commitment".That Chinese exporting companies embroiled in such disputes are levied duties indiscriminately by foreign governments is the reason for the lack of initiative on the part of Chinese exporters to respond to anti-dumping complaints;what underlies the readiness of some western countries to resort to ant-dumping suits against China is their discrimination towards Chinese exporters.Such discrimination in essence is an important means to enhance the credibility of the threat to resort to anti-dumping measures.To redress this situation requires considerable effort and ingenuity.