创新型中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈及信贷稳定策略研究

创新型中小企业融资难由来已久,特别是在以间接融资为主的金融环境下如何明晰银企关系,形成与之匹配的信贷策略,是化解企业融资约束的关键。本文首先建立银企演化博弈的理论框架,对创新型中小企业与商业银行的信贷行为演化过程及演化稳定性标准进行探讨,并从创新风险与监管奖惩两个维度构建银企演化博弈模型,分析两类群体在长期信贷博弈中的演化稳定策略。结果表明,银企双方均对高收益策略有模仿倾向,但创新型中小企业在与银行的长期合作中会对少数企业的违约行为具有抵御性;研发创业期企业所受融资约束最高,当且仅当创新成功率高于最小下限时,商业银行才考虑与企业发生信贷关系;政府、信用担保等外部力量与内生要素的相互制衡对实现银企信贷稳定状态具有重要作用。

Research on Evolutionary Game and Credit Stable Strategies between Innovative SMEs and Commercial Banks

Innovative small and medium enterprises(Innovative SMEs) have been facing financing difficulties for a long time.Especially in the indirect financing dominate environment,it is the key of solving innovative SMEs’ financing constraints that how to clarify bank-enterprise relationship and put forward reasonable credit strategies.Based on the theoretical framework of evolutionary game between banks and enterprises,this paper analyzes the evolutionary process of credit behavior of innovative SMEs and commercial banks,and proposes the strategies of evolutionary stability.Then,this paper establishes evolutionary game models of banks and enterprises from two dimensions of innovative risk and supervision,and discusses two groups’ evolutionary stable strategies in the process of long credit game.This paper reveals several results.First,although both banks and enterprises have the tendency to imitate the high profit strategy,innovative SMEs can resist few companies’ breach of contract.Second,innovative SMEs in the R&D and pioneering period suffer the highest degree of financing constraints.So commercial banks build up the credit relations with innovative SMEs only if the success rate of innovation is higher than minimum lower limit.Third,in order to reach the steady state,evolutionary game of banks and enterprises have to depend on the mutual restriction of endogenous factors and external strength including government and financial intermediaries.