| 管理层股票期权的负激励效应 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 冯翀,陈海棠.管理层股票期权的负激励效应[J].商业研究,2003(22):87-89. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 冯翀 陈海棠 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 杭州电子工业学院财经分院,浙江,杭州,310012 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 股票期权是现代企业激励制度的一次重大创新,在肯定了股票期权,虽然激励制度有一定的优势,然而股票期权在理论与实践中又存在不足之处,结合美国证券市场中的舞弊案例,分析了发放大量股票期权的激励负效应问题与股票期权导致的管理舞弊问题,并提出了股票期权在中国实施的相应对策,同时在我国施行股票期权采取谨慎的态度。
|
| 关 键 词： | 股票期权 负激励效应 管理舞弊 股东权益 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2003)22-0087-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002年11月30 |
The Anti-incentive of Executive Stock Option |
| |
| Abstract: | The Stock Option is a great creation of modern business enterprise incentive system. The incentive system has certain cin-ditional advantages, however, the stock option also has a few disadvantages theoretically and actually. The providing quantity of the exeutive stock option argued and management fraud analysed by unscrambling the last fraud cases on American securities market then conclude that the stockoption should be careful to be put in force in China. |
| |
| Keywords: | Stock option anti - incentive management fraud owner's equity |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
