奖章与陷阱:渐进转轨中的腐败

中国在1970年代后期开始推进以市场化为导向的改革战略，国民经济和社会福利得到迅速的改善和提高，但腐败现象也比较严重；同时，市场化的推进并未能遏制住腐败的扩散，市场化程度较高的地区反而面临着更为严重的腐败现象。通过分析中国的经济转轨过程，本文对此作出了解释。与其他处于经济转轨过程中的经济体相比，中国经济发展所具有的特殊的制度安排既促成了经济的迅速成长，也引发了普遍的腐败问题。它们包括：经济决策的地方分权、双轨制市场化和集体所有的产权形式，这些要素既提高了官员推动经济增长的激励，也促使许多官员以腐败的形式分享经济增长的红利，而以“关系”为基础的社会文化背景、中央政治权威的稳定性有助于减少官员在抽租过程中对经济增长可能产生的负面影响。另外，我们认为，市场化改革对腐败可能产生两方面效应，一方面，市场化通过培育新型的企业家阶层促使大量资源由市场配置，这有助于减少腐败发生的可能性；另一方面．市场化进程通过促进经济增长提高了经济中的租金总量，这成为诱发寻租行为的因素。最终的净效应取决于政府部门的改革。发生在中国的现象可以归结为政府改革的不彻底性。

Award and Pitfall: Corruption during Gradual Transition

Corruption has been accompanied by the market-based reform since late 1970 and significant improvement in national economy and social welfare in China.The advancement in market-based reform has not curbed the corruption diffusion while more corruption has been witnessed in regions where more reform has been carried out.This article explains this phenomenon through an analysis on China economic transition process.Compared with other transitional economies,the special systemic arrangements in China have lead to widespread corruption as well as rapid economic growth.These systemic defaults may include local empowerment in economic decision,dual-track market and the collective ownership form.These factors motivate some government officials to both promote the economy and share the benefits with corruption.Under the context of Guanxi-based culture,the stability of the central government authority helps to decrease the negative impact of officials' corruption on economic growth.We propose that the market-based reform may have kinds of effect on corruption:the increasing number of entrepreneurs helps to allocate resources based on market and thus to decrease corruption;and the increasing amount of total rent tends to incur more rent-seeking behavior.The final net effect depends on government structure reform.The paradox in China's transition economy can be understood as the outcome of halfway reform in government agency.