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中央与地方在物业税税权划分中的博弈行为研究
引用本文:肖婧,孔刘柳.中央与地方在物业税税权划分中的博弈行为研究[J].海南金融,2008(3):26-29.
作者姓名:肖婧  孔刘柳
作者单位:上海理工大学管理学院,上海市,200093
摘    要:物业税又称房地产税或者不动产税,主要是针对房屋、土地等不动产,要求其承租人或保有者每年都按物业评估价值缴付一定税款。本文利用博弈分析的方法,分析了即将开征的物业税和中央与地方政府财政分权之间的关系,并得出结论,由于信息不对称,物业税的开征所带来的效率损失是在所难免的,其开征的关键还在于理清中央和地方政府之间的财税关系。

关 键 词:物业税  博弈论  中央政府  地方政府  研究
文章编号:1003-9031(2008)03-0026-04
修稿时间:2007年11月27

Central Government and Local Government
XIAO Jing,KONG Liu-liu.Central Government and Local Government[J].Hainan Finance,2008(3):26-29.
Authors:XIAO Jing  KONG Liu-liu
Abstract:The property tax which also called the real estate tax or the personal property tax,mainly aims at the house,real estate and so on.It requests its tenant or holder pays certain tax money every year by the appraised property value.This article applies the gambling analysis method to analyze the beginning property tax and the relations between the central committee and the local authority finance decentralization.And it draws the conclusion that because information is asymmetrical,it is unavoidable to bring efficiency loss when property tax begins levying,and that the key also lies in making clear the finance and taxation relations between the central committee and local authority.
Keywords:Property Tax  Theory of the Game  the Central Government  the Local Government  Study
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