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市场竞争、EVA评价与企业过度投资
引用本文:刘凤委,李琦.市场竞争、EVA评价与企业过度投资[J].会计研究,2013(2).
作者姓名:刘凤委  李琦
作者单位:1. 上海国家会计学院/上海财经大学博士后流动站 201702
2. 上海国际集团博士后工作站/复旦大学工商管理博士后流动站 200041
基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年项目,教育部人文社科一般项目,上海哲学社科基金项目,中国博士后科学基金项目,上海教委科研创新项目
摘    要:在国资委对央企全面推行经济增加值(EVA)业绩考核之际,本文利用央企控股上市公司的数据,实证检验了EVA对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现,EVA评价体系的实施可显著降低央企过度投资;进一步研究显示,市场竞争环境差异对EVA抑制过度投资的效果产生显著影响,竞争度越高的行业EVA抑制企业过度投资的作用更为明显;反之则并不显著。本文研究结论支持了EVA评价机制应用的有效性,但也从产业竞争角度证明市场经营环境的改善是进一步提升EVA业绩评价体系有效性充分发挥的关键。

关 键 词:EVA  过度投资  市场竞争

Market Competition,EVA Evaluation and Corporate Over-investment
Abstract:At the time whenSASAC implements the EVA performance evaluation in Central SOEs, this article uses the data of the listed companies held by Central SOEs to test the relationship among the Market competition, the EVA evaluation and Over-investment. The research finds that EVA evaluation system can significantly reduce corporate over-investment. A further research indicates that the market competition environment is related to the impact of EVA on corporate investment. The effect of EVA on over-investment is more significant in higher-competition industries. This means that market competition degree is the important attribute to EVA evaluation system function. This article proves that market competition environment has significant influence on the enterprise internal government mechanism function, and also provides empirical evidence to Central SOEs corporate governance development.
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