Financial Distress and the Cross‐section of Equity Returns

We explicitly consider financial leverage in a simple equity valuation model and study the cross‐sectional implications of potential shareholder recovery upon resolution of financial distress. Our model is capable of simultaneously explaining lower returns for financially distressed stocks, stronger book‐to‐market effects for firms with high default likelihood, and the concentration of momentum profits among low credit quality firms. The model further predicts (i) a hump‐shaped relationship between value premium and default probability, and (ii) stronger momentum profits for nearly distressed firms with significant prospects for shareholder recovery. Our empirical analysis strongly confirms these novel predictions.     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

Do Low‐Priced Stocks Drive Long‐Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange?

We investigate whether low‐priced stocks drive long‐term contrarian performance on the U.K. market. We find that contrarian performance at low, middle, and high price levels is positive. On the Fama‐French risk adjusted basis, we find both low‐priced and middle‐priced losers have significantly positive returns. When we adjust returns by market and liquidity risk, only middle‐priced losers maintain their positive returns. Our results reveal that low‐priced stocks are not fully responsible for contrarian performance. Our empirical evidence is generally consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and behavioral models of value investing.     

Distress Anomaly and Shareholder Risk: International Evidence

Financially distressed stocks in the United States earn puzzlingly low returns giving rise to the distress risk anomaly. We provide evidence that the anomaly exists in developed countries, but not in emerging ones. Using cross‐country analyses, we explore several potential drivers of returns to distressed stocks. The distress anomaly is stronger in countries with stronger takeover legislation, lower barriers to arbitrage, and higher information transparency. In contrast, shareholder bargaining power and expected stock return skewness in a country do not affect the anomaly. These findings suggest that various aspects of shareholders’ risk play an important role in shaping distressed stocks returns.     

Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

We study how investor sentiment affects the cross‐section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning‐of‐period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non‐dividend‐paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.     

The Cross-Section of Volatility and Expected Returns

We examine the pricing of aggregate volatility risk in the cross‐section of stock returns. Consistent with theory, we find that stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility have low average returns. Stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama and French (1993, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 2349) model have abysmally low average returns. This phenomenon cannot be explained by exposure to aggregate volatility risk. Size, book‐to‐market, momentum, and liquidity effects cannot account for either the low average returns earned by stocks with high exposure to systematic volatility risk or for the low average returns of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility.     

Tracking down distress risk

This paper shows that exposure to aggregate distress risk is the underlying source of the premiums for the Fama-French size (SMB) and value (HML) factors. Using a unique data set of aggregate business failures of both private and public firms from 1926 to 1997, I build portfolios that track news about future firm failures. These tracking portfolios optimally hedge aggregate distress risk and earn a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha of approximately −4% a year. Both HML and SMB predict changes in future failure rates. Small stocks have lower returns than large stocks and value stocks have lower returns than growth stocks when the market expects an increase in future failure rates. Finally, a two-factor model with the market and the tracking portfolio for aggregate distress as factors does as well as the Fama-French three-factor model in pricing the 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios.     

Risk‐Adjusted Long‐Term Contrarian Profits: Evidence from Non‐S&P 500 High‐Volume Stocks

Can trading volume help unravel the long‐term overreaction puzzle? With portfolios of non‐S&P 500 NYSE stocks, we show that (1) both the high‐ and low‐volume (abnormal volume) contrarian portfolios earn a much higher market‐adjusted excess return than the normal‐volume contrarian portfolio, (2) however, when leverage‐induced risk is factored in, excess returns from contrarian portfolios with normal‐ and low‐volume stocks are insignificant, (3) only excess returns from high‐volume contrarian stocks are significant and cannot be explained by the time‐varying risk and return framework, and (4) such high‐volume, risk‐adjusted excess returns arise mainly from winner (glamour) stocks.     

Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information

The book‐to‐market effect is often interpreted as evidence of high expected returns on stocks of “distressed” firms with poor past performance. We dispute this interpretation. We find that while a stock's future return is unrelated to the firm's past accounting‐based performance, it is strongly negatively related to the “intangible” return, the component of its past return that is orthogonal to the firm's past performance. Indeed, the book‐to‐market ratio forecasts returns because it is a good proxy for the intangible return. Also, a composite equity issuance measure, which is related to intangible returns, independently forecasts returns.     

Idiosyncratic Volatility Covariance and Expected Stock Returns

Given that the idiosyncratic volatility (IDVOL) of individual stocks co‐varies, we develop a model to determine how aggregate idiosyncratic volatility (AIV) may affect the volatility of a portfolio with a finite number of stocks. In portfolio and cross‐sectional tests, we find that stocks whose returns are more correlated with AIV innovations have lower returns than those that are less correlated with AIV innovations. These results are robust to controlling for the stock's own IDVOL and market volatility. We conclude that risk‐averse investors pay a premium for stocks that pay well when AIV is high, consistent with our model.     

Is an Auditor's Propensity to Issue Going Concern Opinions a Valid Measure of Audit Quality?

A number of previous studies use auditor propensity to issue a going concern opinion (GCO) as a proxy of audit quality when examining a sample of financially distressed firms. This study examines whether audit quality (measured by discretionary accruals) influences the probability of financially distressed firms receiving GCOs using a non‐specific sample of 2937 firm‐year observations from Australia over the period 2011–2015. The study first investigates the association between financially distressed firms and the issuance of GCOs. This association is then re‐tested after separating the total sample into low and high audit quality subsamples. The results indicate that financially distressed firms are more likely to receive GCOs, confirming the application of ASA 570 Going Concern. However, financially distressed firms that receive GCOs from their auditors are limited to firms that have higher‐quality audits.     

The value, size, and momentum spread during distressed economic periods

We study the behavior of market risk, value, small cap, and momentum premia under different macro economic scenarios. If these factors are risk factors, then these factors offer high returns to investors at times when the gain (marginal utility) of additional consumption is low (good economic times) and low returns at times when the gain (marginal utility) of additional consumption is high (bad economics times). Our results show that market risk and small cap premia behave more like risk factors while value premium does not. In fact, our results show that a portfolio with a long position in value and a short position in growth is a hedge in the down market and recessionary periods. Our results also show that a momentum premium exists under different economically distressed scenarios we studied.     

The Importance of Cash-Flow News for Financially Distressed Firms

Previous studies have shown that stock prices are moved primarily by news about discount rates (expected returns). I argue that when a firm experiences financial distress, news about cashflows becomes more dominant in driving its stock returns. Applying Campbell's (1991) variance decomposition framework to financially distressed firms supports this argument. Furthermore, I find that more bankruptcies occur after negative shocks to expected cashflows than after positive shocks to discount rates; and that stock prices of distressed firms are less sensitive than those of sound firms to changes in equity risk.     

Historic Changes in the High Yield Bond Market

In a history that now stretches about four decades, the high yield (HY) market has experienced growth in issuance and out‐standings that is remarkable both for its level (about 13% per annum, with HY bonds now accounting for about 25% of the total corporate bond market) and its cyclicality and sensitivity to the broad economy. The HY market has also experienced a notable shift away from B‐rated bonds and toward both lower‐risk Ba‐rated bonds and, to a lesser extent, more risky Caa‐rated bonds. Consistent with this development, studies of the performance of HY bonds show Ba‐rated bonds experiencing not only lower risk, but also higher returns than Caa‐rated bonds, which have produced surprisingly low average returns along with exceptionally high volatility. At the same time, studies of the correlation of HY bond returns with returns on other major asset classes report that all classes of HY bonds (but particularly the riskier B‐ and Caa‐rated bonds) have consistently stronger relationships with common stocks (especially small‐cap stocks) than with Treasuries and investment‐grade bonds. Analysis of the volatility of HY bond returns over time shows that during periods of stability in the economy and financial markets, the volatility of HY bond returns has been very similar to that of investment‐grade bonds. But during periods of political or economic uncertainty, the volatility of HY bonds has become two or three times that of investment‐grade bonds, approaching the volatility of common stocks. The main driver of the significant increase in the risk of the aggregate HY bond market during periods of uncertainty has been Caa‐rated bonds, whose risk pattern has been remarkably similar to that of small‐cap common stocks. Analysis of the credit risk spread (or CRS) series for both the composite HY bond market and each of its rating categories shows markedly non‐normal distributions with significant positive “skewness”—that is, periods of exceptionally high spreads (that are not counterbalanced by periods of exceptionally low spreads). The authors also report a consistently strong relationship of the CRS series with default rates and the general state of the economy, with major peaks occurring during or shortly after economic recessions. Near the end of 2008, however, there was a clear break in this relationship when the CRS reached an historic peak of 2,000 basis points, or more than five standard deviations above its long‐term mean, while the default rate (at 4%) was below its long‐term average. The authors offer two explanations for this break in CRS‐default rate relationship: the jump in the CRS caused by the extreme flight to quality and drop in liquidity for all risky securities during the second half of 2008; and the use of covenant‐lite securities and other sources of financial flexibility that appear to have enabled many HY issuers to defer defaults (if not avoid them entirely).     

Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment

This paper derives a real options model that accounts for the value premium. If real investment is largely irreversible, the book value of assets of a distressed firm is high relative to its market value because it has idle physical capital. The firm's excess installed capital capacity enables it to fully benefit from positive aggregate shocks without undertaking costly investment. Thus, returns to equity holders of a high book‐to‐market firm are sensitive to aggregate conditions and its systematic risk is high. Simulations indicate that the model goes a long way toward accounting for the observed value premium.     

Housing Collateral, Consumption Insurance, and Risk Premia: An Empirical Perspective

In a model with housing collateral, the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth shifts the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. A decrease in house prices reduces the collateral value of housing, increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and increases the conditional market price of risk. Using aggregate data for the United States, we find that a decrease in the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth predicts higher returns on stocks. Conditional on this ratio, the covariance of returns with aggregate risk factors explains 80% of the cross‐sectional variation in annual size and book‐to‐market portfolio returns.     

Size,value, and momentum in developed country equity returns: Macroeconomic and liquidity exposures

The paper investigates value and momentum factors in 23 developed international stock markets. We find that typically value and momentum premia are smaller and more negatively correlated for large market capitalization stocks relative to small. Momentum factors are more highly correlated internationally relative to value. We provide international evidence on three sets of risk exposures of value and momentum returns: macroeconomic risk, funding liquidity risk, and stock market liquidity risk. We find that value returns are typically lower prior to a recession while momentum returns often exhibit little sensitivity. Value returns are typically lower in times of poor funding liquidity, whereas, with notable exceptions, momentum returns are typically unaffected. Lastly, for almost all countries, value returns are high in poor stock market liquidity conditions.     

Have European Stocks become More Volatile? An Empirical Investigation of Idiosyncratic and Market Risk in the Euro Area

We examine the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk, market risk and return correlations in European equity markets using weekly observations from 3515 stocks listed in the 12 euro area stock markets over the period 1974–2004. Similarly to Campbell et al. (2001) , we find a rise in idiosyncratic volatility, implying that it now takes more stocks to diversify away idiosyncratic risk. Contrary to the US, however, market risk is trended upwards in Europe and correlations are not trended downwards. Both the volatility and correlation measures are pro‐cyclical, and they rise during times of low market returns. Market and average idiosyncratic volatility jointly predict market wide returns, and the latter impact upon both market and idiosyncratic volatility. This has asset pricing and risk management implications.     

Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms

This paper provides evidence of risk‐shifting behavior in the investment decisions of financially distressed firms. Using a real options framework, I show that shareholders' risk‐shifting incentives can reverse the expected negative relation between volatility and investment. I test two hypotheses that are consistent with risk‐shifting behavior: (i) volatility has a positive effect on distressed firms' investment; (ii) investments of distressed firms generate less value during times of high uncertainty. Empirical evidence using 40 years of data supports both hypotheses. I further evaluate the effect of various firm characteristics on risk shifting, and estimate the costs of the investment distortion.     

Risk Interpretation of the CAPM's Beta: Evidence from a New Research Method

This study tests the validity of using the CAPM beta as a risk control in cross‐sectional accounting and finance research. We recognize that high‐risk stocks should experience either very good or very bad returns more frequently compared to low‐risk stocks, that is, high‐risk stocks should cluster in the tails of the cross‐sectional return distribution. Building on this intuition, we test the risk interpretation of the CAPM's beta by examining if high‐beta stocks are more likely than low‐beta stocks to experience either very high or very low returns. Our empirical results indicate that beta is a strong predictor of large positive and large negative returns, which confirms that beta is a valid empirical risk measure and that researchers should use beta as a risk control in empirical tests. Further, we show that because the relation between beta and returns is U‐shaped, that is, high betas predict both very high and very low returns, linear cross‐sectional regression models, for example, Fama–MacBeth regressions, will fail on average to reject the null hypothesis that beta does not capture risk. This result explains why previous studies find no significant cross‐sectional relation between beta and returns.